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This report has three main aims: a) to highlight the main 
issues that arise in the global food system arising from 
the application of mainstream European Union (EU) com-
petition law; b) to discuss how social and environmental 
sustainability could be integrated into the current struc-
ture of EU competition law and suggest needed legal and 
political interventions; c) to identify concrete possibilities 
of engagement and those areas of substantive and proce-
dural competition law that could be leveraged in order to 
improve the social and environmental quality of the global 
food system. 
The underlying research was carried out using a combina-
tion of: 
a desk-based research (including reviews of academic lit-
erature and case law);
b assessment of concrete examples and third parties’ ini-
tiatives (field studies, reports, and reportages); and 
c collection of opinion — through semi-structured inter-
views — from academics, civil society and practitioners 
who are directly involved in the study and/or imple-
mentation of EU competition law. 
Summary
In light of the research for the report, and interviews and 
written submissions, the following points emerged:
1 Competition law has played a central role in the con-
struction of the contemporary EU food system and the 
maldistribution of value across the food chain. Howev-
er, the distributive and environmental impact of com-
petition law and the way in which it defines the rela-
tionships of power and value within the food chain are 
not natural or inevitable. 
2 As the current antitrust mantra predicates the enforce-
ment of competition law mainly when there are ineffi-
ciencies created at consumer level (consumer welfare 
approach), competition laws have generally allowed 
and contributed to the creation of markets based on 
cheap products, disregarding their environmental and 
social sustainability (Section 2).
3 The food system has witnessed increasing levels of 
concentration of market power, in particular, in sectors 
such as seeds, chemicals, food processing and retail-
ing. These mergers and acquisitions have been cleared 
within the context of an EU regulation that has main-
ly considered consumer welfare and the sale of cheap 
and — to a certain extent — innovative products (Sec-
tion 4).
4 There is a renewed interest in tackling issues of sus-
tainability and fundamental rights by also using com-
petition laws, but the current interpretation of the un-
derlying provisions makes it particularly difficult if not 
impossible.
5 The current interpretation of Article 101 TFEU on an-
ticompetitive agreements and cartels, from this per-
spective, is sometimes too strict and at other times too 
broad (Section 4.6):
a It is broad when it sanctions any discussion among 
competitors on the distribution of price along the 
value chain, without considering finalities and 
objectives. The consequence is that the risk of a 
sanction — real or perceived — is often used by au-
thorities and market actors to deny the possibility 
of setting a transparent and coordinated common 
price for small scale farmers, except in cases of spe-
cial derogations and exemptions (Section 5.7.).
b It is often interpreted in a way that rigidly dismisses 
any efficiency mechanism related to sustainability 
from the application of Article 101(3).
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6 Similar problems haunt the application of Article 102 
TFEU on the abuse of dominant position. When the 
exercise of vertical power across the food chain is as-
sessed, sustainability-related efficiencies and market 
failures are not considered per se, neither as a justifi-
cation for investigation nor as a concern of competition 
law (Section 4.2). Moreover, the law is often subject to a 
narrow interpretation that disregards all those abuses 
of power that do not strictly conform to the definition 
of dominance. The way in which European and nation-
al authorities regulate the abuse of dominant position, 
Art. 102 TFEU, is only partially recognising and disci-
plining the imbalance in bargaining power that charac-
terises actors at different levels of the food chain and 
often degenerates in the extraction of value from small-
er players (farmers, intermediaries, etc.) and accumula-
tion of value in few hubs.
7 As the historical assessment of competition law shows 
(Section I), the legislative and jurisprudential charac-
teristics of the current EU framework are contextual 
and politically defined: as such, they can and must be 
challenged if they are incompatible with the current 
and future social and environmental needs of people 
and the planet. Since its inception, competition law 
has changed its aims and objectives over time, show-
ing that these i) are not immutable; ii) are connected to 
the economic and social policies of the legal system in 
which they are enforced; iii) can be changed and adapt-
ed to the present and future needs of people and the 
planet. We thus suggest that competition law should be 
re-thought in order to contribute to the construction of 
a food chain (and an economy) that respects the plan-
etary boundaries and strengthens the social founda-
tions of a just and equitable global society. 
8 For this reason, Section 5 of this report looks at compe-
tition law as part of a regulatory environment that re-
sponds to the neoliberal ‘rule of law’, intended as “the 
principle whereby all members of a society (including 
those in government)” and — we would add — includ-
ing all institutions “are considered equally subject to 
publicly disclosed legal codes and processes,”1 and 
where the principles of efficiencies, effectiveness and 
market autonomy have priority over all other consid-
erations. On the contrary, we claim that competition 
law, as much as economics and law, does not exist in a 
socio-environmental vacuum and is not an end in itself. 
It is instead a legal institution useful to assess, combat 
and restrain specific behaviours but, has however, to 
find application within the limits and the purposes of 
the overall legal and political environment. If a contract 
is illegal because it breaches a law on environmental 
protection, the agreement is null and no contractual 
party can sue for breach of contract: the sanctity of con-
tract law does not trump mandatory and external legal 
constraints. In other words, the law is always applied in 
accordance with the rest of the regulatory environment. 
By the same token, EU competition law needs to be ap-
plied in accordance with other EU laws, principles, and 
objectives. However, this solves only the ‘if’ and ‘why’ 
of the question of whether competition law should con-
sider such sustainability concerns. The ‘how’ is instead 
slightly more complex and needs adaptation from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. For this reason, at the end of the 
report we recommend practical solutions for the attain-
ment of this transformation, although they are merely 
initial hints to spark further political and legal dialogue.
9 Despite the role that the law plays in allowing market 
failures and unsustainable practices, the present re-
search concludes that most of the flaws could be solved 
through a broader interpretation and enforcement of 
competition laws that go beyond the current main-
stream approach to consumer welfare and is coherent 
with the requirements of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
10 A comprehensive and systemic reform of EU competi-
tion law along the double legal and political constraints 
represented by the planetary boundaries and the need 
to strengthen the social foundations of our society is 
not only needed, but also possible. Inspired by Kate 
Raworth’s idea of ‘Doughnut Economics,’2 the report 
offers a series of suggestions and recommendations 
that concern both the interpretation of the current legal 
framework and the possibility to introduce changes to 
the substance and procedure of European and national 
laws. 
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Overall, the report recognises that some cracks exist in the 
current framework of competition law and that they can be 
leveraged to improve the socio-environmental footprint of 
the global food system. However, a transformation in the 
content and functioning of competition law must be ac-
companied by a better understanding of its dynamics, its 
content and the fact that it is politically defined. Born as 
a policy tool to fight private ‘trusts’ of power, antitrust law 
has more recently become an overly complex and often 
inaccessible legal instrument. However, it is still the ex-
pression of specific ideologies, although often disguised by 
technical economic and legal jargon. With this in mind, it 
is important to understand that working within the current 
framework of competition law is equal to asking ‘the mas-
ter of market efficiency and competition as an end in itself’ 
to provide the tools to defy itself. 
For a radical and structural transition towards socio-en-
vironmentally sustainable food systems, we may want to 
explore and implement other forms of social organisation 
(cooperatives, commons, indigenous forms of production 
and consumption, etc.). Throughout the world, plenty of 
examples exist where production, transformation, distribu-
tion and consumption of food are not based on competi-
tion and domination, but on practices of solidarity, coor-
dination, mutuality and — often — the recognition of the 
necessity to respect and fulfil social and planetary bound-
aries if we are to achieve a truly sustainable food system. 
This report does not engage with these alternatives but 
recognises the inherent limits of competition law. The 
authors welcome future research that looks at these dif-
ferent conceptions of market, social organisation and the 
way in which goods and services are produced, circulated 
and their value shared. These political and legal attempts 
should have a strong and clear understanding of compe-
tition law as their starting point and go beyond its limits 
and its aims. The scope of this report is instead to describe 
the current boundaries of competition law, trying to avoid 
technical jargon, and to propose a more holistic vision of 
the competitive processes in the market and in society.
11 The most important transformation is conceptual and 
concerns both the vision of competition law and its 
function. Article 101 and 102 TFEU and the Merger Reg-
ulation do not establish specific aims and objectives to 
be achieved in the enforcement of competition laws, 
neither do they embrace specific policy demands. It 
is thus essential to recognise that competition law is 
a public interest, which is influenced by the pursuit of 
legal, economic and policy aims. As these objectives 
may change over time, competition law offers the pos-
sibility — in theory — to balance the application of its 
underlying provisions against these objectives. At the 
present time, the core of competition law is represent-
ed by consumer welfare and a cost-benefit balance be-
tween it and the monetary value of socio-environmen-
tal concerns. As a consequence, sustainability has to be 
expressed in monetary terms and the case made that 
consumers are ready to internalise its consequences. 
However, national and European policy makers can 
seize the space offered by the undefined notion of pub-
lic interest and clarify the objectives of competition law 
and the role that it must play in achieving sustainability 
rather than affecting it.
12 Another opportunity discussed in this report is rep-
resented by a right to a food-based interpretation of 
competition law which subordinates the economic 
goal of competition to the legal obligation of states to 
guarantee adequate, accessible, sustainable, nutri-
tional and reliable food for everyone, within the con-
text of a food chain that equally respects the rights of 
small-scale producers and consumers. National and 
European competition authorities not only have the 
opportunity to adopt a right to food-based approach to 
competition law but are required to do so because of 
the international obligations that have been assumed 
by each Member State and the content of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
13 Specific regulation might be needed when ex-post 
competition law intervention is not fit for purpose. In 
particular, this report argues that sector-specific anti-
trust regulation, such as block exemptions or other ex-
ceptions to the application of competition laws, may be 
desirable only when competition law is found to be the 
best institution to solve such market failures.
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Glossary
Abuse of dominant position: a situa-
tion in which a dominant firm exploits 
customers or excludes competitors, 
usually to maintain, or even improve, 
its position in the market. This notion 
is particularly useful to understand-
ing Article 102 of the TFEU (see Sec-
tions 2.1.2 and 4.2).
Cartel: an arrangement between two 
or more firms to avoid competition 
between them, for example by fixing 
prices and dividing geographic mar-
kets. This notion is mainly applied 
in the case of horizontal agreements 
and Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) (see Sections 2.1.1 and 4.6).
Economic dependence: a situation 
of imbalance in the business rela-
tionship between two firms, which 
makes it impossible or excessively 
difficult for one to continue with the 
business without the other. For exam-
ple, because one firm has undertaken 
specific investments in order to work 
with the other firm. The abuse of eco-
nomic dependence generally takes 
the form of a refusal to purchase or 
sell, or arbitrary interruption of busi-
ness relationships. This has implica-
tions in terms of bargaining power 
(see Section 2.1.2 and 4.2).
Externality: market exchanges (pur-
chases, sales, mergers, acquisitions, 
etc.) may bring about effects — pos-
itive or negative — on third parties. If 
the effects are positive, we talk about 
external benefits. For example, the 
bees of a beekeeper pollinating the 
orchard of a neighbouring farmer. An 
external cost or negative externality 
(also just called externality), is instead 
a market failure, as it is a cost that 
spills over onto a third party. For ex-
ample, a factory dumping waste in a 
river that flows downstream through 
a town. 
Horizontal agreement: an agreement 
between competitors. This is at the 
heart of Article 101 of the TFEU and 
often cited by businesses to prevent 
any conversation around the adop-
tion of a common livelihood price to 
be paid to farmers at the beginning of 
the food chain (see Sections 2.1.1 and 
4.6).
Market concentration: is a function of 
the number of firms in a market and 
their market share. In general, the 
lower the number of firms the high-
er the market concentration. In the 
context of the food chain, this has im-
plications in terms of the application 
of merger regulations (see Section 
2.1.3.), bargaining power, innovation, 
availability of products and depend-
ency (See Sections 2.1.2 and 4.2).
Merger: any combination of two com-
panies previously independent. This 
is dealt with by the EU in Regulation 
139/2004 on Mergers Regulation and 
the subsequent interventions by the 
European Commission and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (see Sections 
2.1.3 and 4.5).
Monopoly: a situation in which there 
is only one firm in the relevant market. 
This has implications in terms of abus-
es of dominant position (see Sections 
2.1.2 and 4.2).
Monopsony: a situation in which there 
is only one buyer in the relevant mar-
ket that can thus exercise significant 
bargaining power over producers. This 
is particularly relevant in the food sec-
tor (see Sections 2.1.2 and 4.2).
Oligopoly: a situation in which there is 
only a small number of competitors in 
a market.
Oligopsony: a situation in which there 
is only a small number of buyers in a 
market.
Vertical agreement: an agreement be-
tween a buyer and a seller along the 
same chain of production. This may 
have implications in terms of abuse 
of dominant position, anticompetitive 
agreements, unfair trading practices, 
bargaining power, dependency and 
distribution of value across the food 
chain (see Section 5 for some of the 
main issues that arise in this area).
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People, companies and governments are constantly en-
gaged in the production, trade, and consumption of goods 
and services. According to the mainstream account, the 
‘venues’ where these exchanges take place are called ‘mar-
kets’. Although these markets are the sum of a number of 
interactions that involve people and resources in a specif-
ic environment that is highly contextual and much more 
complex than pure formalised operations, mainstream 
economics theory abstracts them and defines them as 
rational and organised around principles and operations 
that are replicable everywhere in the world. The ‘laws of 
the market’ are presented as inescapable, universal and 
natural. Modern markets are therefore defined as struc-
tures allowing for the exchange of goods and services in a 
defined area. They follow specific economic rules and need 
to be economically efficient, in order to yield the optimal 
outcome. 
Based on these abstract, and not sufficiently criticised as-
sumptions, competition laws are used to better regulate 
the interactions between market participants, legislators 
and law enforcers and should only be concerned with the 
economic efficiency of the market. Any other question 
related to the effects of an exchange on society or on the 
environment should be left outside of the scrutiny of com-
petition law. So, for instance, the fact that an exchange has 
negative effects on the environment would not play any 
role in an antitrust examination if it has no clear relation 
to the assessment of economic efficiency, which gener-
ally considers only prices, choice, and to some extent in-
novation3. Competition law ensures that businesses are 
competing fairly in the market, thereby preventing market 
distortions or remedying restrictions of fair competition in 
the market. At present, the mainstream theory wants these 
distortions and the efficiencies created by the same market 
interactions to have only an economic character.
However, at closer examination, this narrow view seems 
theoretically biased and dangerous in practice, in respect 
of the conduct it may allow and the harm that may go un-
checked. Orthodox economists discovered the paradox 
underlying the concept of efficiency quite some time ago. 
In 1865, for example, William Stanley Jevons observed that 
an important issue haunts efficiency. In the context of the 
British Empire, Great Britain was one of the most (if not the 
most) industrialised countries in the world and was main-
ly relying on coal as a source of energy. According to the 
theory technological innovation should have increased the 
efficiency of coal use. By contrast, Jevons observed that 
technological progress was leading to more coal consump-
tion across many industries, due to increased productivity. 
Efficiency, therefore, did not mean reduced 
use of resources but rather increased con-
sumption and exploitation.
Furthermore, this efficiency paradigm failed to consider 
the costs of increasing production and fuel consumption 
on the environment (today known in economic terms as 
the ‘rebound effect’). 
Competition laws in most modern jurisdictions slavishly 
apply this narrow approach to economic efficiency that 
overlooks other — possible — negative or positive effects 
that might be created by market participants. But is this 
narrow interpretation of the law the only possible one? 
This report answers this question in the negative. Firstly, 
it observes that from an historical and legal perspective, 
there is no compelling reason to limit the application of 
competition laws to narrow speculations of price efficiency 
mechanisms (Section 1). In order to make this argument, 
this report elucidates the status quo of EU competition law, 
briefly introducing the main provisions in simple terms 
(Section 2). Then, it examines the actual and potential aims 
of competition policy and competition law enforcement 
(Section 3). Moreover, it explores the actual and potential 
applications of different public policy aims in competition 
law enforcement (Section 4). In that connection, it presents 
the actual situation of food systems (Section 5) and exam-
ines, in detail, the major competition policy issues affecting 
food value chains (Section 6). In its conclusion, the docu-
ment formulates proposals for an alternative reading of the 
law and offers suggestions for the future development of a 
sustainable competition law where environmental and so-
cial limits are not simply integrated but become building 
blocks in the construction of markets and in the relation-
ship between its actors and nature. 
Introduction: Competition 
Law and Socio-Environmental 
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Traditional accounts of the history of modern competition 
law report that it first appeared in 1890, when the Sherman 
Antitrust Act was passed by the United States Congress to 
tackle the high level of concentration that was affecting 
some of the most sensitive sectors of the federal econo-
my.4 At a moment of diffused monopolies, high prices, low 
investments and control of the economy by a few financial 
conglomerates, the Sherman Act aimed to break down car-
tels, foster competition and fix the failures of markets in the 
name of low prices for consumers and growth for the coun-
try.5 It was a moment of economic turmoil, and the same 
was true for economic thinking: far from being undisput-
ed, the principles that were crystallised in the Sherman Act 
(and that have been at the centre of competition law for 
the last 130 years) had just been rescued from being mar-
ginalised. 
Despite the mainstream accounts and the idea that the 
Sherman Act signalled the dawn of competition law, the 
economic and legal rationale behind the interaction be-
tween states and markets are rooted in an intellectual and 
financial transformation that began long before the Sher-
man Act, when Great Britain was still the leading global em-
pire. It was then, when the Corn Laws were still protecting 
English farmers and colonialism was at its height, that the 
idea of free trade as the best way to achieve global well-be-
ing was advanced by Adam Smith and then integrated by 
classical political economists such as Thomas Malthus, Da-
vid Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and the like.6 Then, with the 
diffusion of utilitarianism and mathematical reconstruc-
tions of the economy in the second half of the 19th centu-
ry at Cambridge, Yale and Chicago, classical principles got 
reinterpreted through the lenses of equilibrium and mar-
ginal cost, giving birth to the contemporary understanding 
of economics.
As a matter of fact, modern competition law is 
materially and historically embedded in West-
ern history and in the Western way of thinking 
about society and the role and organisation  
of the market. 
Certainly, the experiences of the United States and of Eu-
rope differ, but they share premises, practices and out-
comes that cannot be disconnected from the geographies 
and historical moments where they were conceived, imple-
mented and criticised. Similarly, processes of transplanta-
tion, imitation, imposition and adaptation (often favoured 
by the intervention of international financial institutions 
and donor countries) expanded the global influence of the 
regulatory and intellectual frameworks developed on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
This report does not thoroughly engage with the rationale 
and ideologies that articulated market-based capitalism 
and the shift away from mercantilism and state-led econ-
omies. Similarly, we cannot spend time discussing the way 
in which the internationalisation of liberal and neoliberal 
capitalism was accompanied by the diffusion of the Euro-
pean and North American visions of competition law. How-
ever, it is interesting to note the historical and personal 
settings in which these ideas were proposed. For example, 
the idea of breaking up monopolies and reducing state in-
tervention in the economy was formulated by Adam Smith 
almost 150 years after the Statute of Monopolies, a legisla-
tive act that defined the powers of the UK Crown to grant 
the rights to incorporate and have a monopoly over trade 
routes, was passed in 1624.7 When Smith was discussing 
the need to liberalise trade and the difference between 
market and natural prices of commodities, he was reacting 
to a national economy where few corporations could legally 
operate in Great Britain (the East India Company being the 
most famous and powerful one) and these were granted 
the exclusive right to trade with specific areas of the world 
so that they could appropriate extra value at the expense of 
nature, workers and, more importantly for Smith, consum-
ers and the general public.8 As a matter of fact, it was the 
close connection between the monopoly guaranteed by 
the state and the private form of the joint stock company 
that had transformed Great Britain into an empire on which 
“the sun never sets”. 
If Smith’s idea of a free market was affected by the vision of 
the British Empire and its Commonwealth, it is also a fact 
that Malthus and Ricardo’s theories were intrinsically de-
termined by the political and historical framework where 
these two economists operated and are closely connected 
with the relationship between land, food, economy and so-
ciety. In the case of Malthus, for example, his ideas of insuffi-
ciency and overpopulation were developed at a time when 
the European population had increased and states with no 
resources to feed their own citizens looked at private in-
vestments and entrepreneurship to guarantee increased 
yields and higher productivity. Similarly, Ricardo (who was 
1   The Political History of 
Competition Law on both 
Sides of the Atlantic 
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also a grain trader) supported his ideas on opportunity cost 
and comparative advantage, that derive from the combi-
nation of capital (land and machinery) and labour, by cit-
ing the example of English clothes and Portuguese sherry 
wine. Sherry wine was a good that English merchants par-
ticularly appreciated at the time, and was then produced 
in Portuguese estates owned by English families. The en-
thusiasm around these theories, that have been debunked 
and criticised for centuries, was thus a consequence of the 
commercial and political interests of the time and the need 
to legitimise the reproduction of the status quo.
Classical political economists were thus fully embedded in 
the British imperial economy of the time, both theoretical-
ly and practically. From their condition of social and eco-
nomic privilege, and sometimes for their own interest, they 
conceived a world where the premise for free trade had to 
be put in place by means of a public authority. For many 
of them, joint stock companies (the precursors of modern 
corporations) were the most effective way of organising 
production and labour, and the role of the state was to fix 
market failures dependent on factors which were internal 
or external to the market itself. In the 18th century, the 
market began being perceived as separate from people and 
nature, and the state was there as a regulator that should 
guarantee fluidity of interactions. However, it was only in 
the 19th century with the consolidation of businesses and 
the accumulation of ownership by a few corporate actors, 
that the United States fostered a public discussion around 
the role of trusts (as a combination of industries so big they 
could pose a threat) and whether they were harmful for the 
economy. 
In response, the Sherman Act was passed in 1890. However, 
in the United States there was neither agreement on what 
constituted economic theory, nor on the role of the law in 
shaping and controlling the market. On the contrary, inter-
actions between the law, economics and society were full 
of turmoil.9 In 1898, when four hundred delegates joined 
the Chicago Trust Conference, the political tensions and 
conflicts of vision were obvious.10 As reported by Hatfield 
and other academics who attended the conference,11 the 
participants engaged in heated debates that saw trusts and 
competition, not as pure legal and technical issues to be 
discussed by lawyers, but rather social and political con-
cerns that gathered together capitalists, manufacturers, 
unskilled labourers, trade unionists, farmers professional 
reformers, skilled mechanics, labour commissioners, advo-
cates of single tax systems, economists, commercial travel-
lers and anarchists. For some of the participants, for exam-
ple, the solution against trusts was not their dismantlement 
through the implementation of legal limits to mergers and 
control, but the introduction of unlimited shareholders’ li-
ability for the company’s debt, so as to discourage consoli-
dation and the growth of businesses in both the economic 
and political spheres. 
For decades after the Sherman Act was adopted, the rela-
tionship between states and the market was often charac-
terised by political considerations12, interventionism and 
the recognition that public utilities (like jobs and welfare) 
were best provided by means of public investments and 
non-market dynamics. However, the Cold War and the fall 
of the Berlin Wall radically changed the scenario. 
A look at which countries enacted competition 
law rules, the quality of their regulations and 
the timing of their legislative interventions says 
a lot about the geo-political construction of 
the world and the power struggle between the 
capitalist and Soviet model. 
In the 1980s only 20 countries had enacted competition 
laws in the world. By the 1990s and the year 2000, the num-
ber had grown to 80. In 2009 there were 107 countries cov-
ering the four corners of the planet, from Latin America to 
Asia.13
The history of antitrust law in the European Union is more 
recent than that of the USA but is closely connected with 
the debate that has taken place on the other side of the 
Atlantic and is intrinsically intertwined with the Europe-
an project itself. The goal of a common market for goods 
was the founding project of the European Economic Coal 
and Steel Community in May 1950, with the elaboration of 
common rules for governments and private actors. As the 
then EU competition officer, Mario Monti, remembered 
at an American Bar Association Meeting in 2001,14 Jean 
Monet (one of the founding fathers of today’s European 
project) recalled the role played by the then Secretary of 
State, Dean Acheson, in introducing a competition culture 
to Europe. The newly born organisation of markets had to 
be, according to Monet, “the opposite of an international 
cartel designed to segment and exploit national markets 
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by means of restrictive practices.”15 However, “European 
Commission (EC) competition provisions were not reflect-
ing a wholehearted commitment to fierce competition: 
merger control was not mentioned with a single word in 
the Treaty of Rome, and dominant market positions were 
not prohibited as long as there was no ‘abuse’ of it.”16 
As discussed by Davis, Kaplinsky and Morris: 
“[o]ver the forty years after its introduction, EU compe-
tition law widened to promote a range of objectives in-
cluding economic democracy, fairness, competition in 
the internal market, and protection of final consumers 
and small and medium enterprises. However, over the 
past decade EU competition law has become increasing-
ly influenced by the principles embodied in US jurispru-
dence, reflecting the influence of the neoliberal Chicago 
School of Economics on US competition policy.”17 
Despite a series of contrasts and tensions that went further 
than those that had emerged in the United States at the 
end of the 19th century, the current framework appears 
squeezed towards a technocratic and regulatory under-
standing of competition law as promoted by the Chicago 
School: as recalled by Monti, the US model of sound eco-
nomics and protection of consumer interest was assumed 
as a term of reference and the interventions of national 
and regional authorities was aimed at, and limited by these 
goals. 
The shift from social objectives to efficiency which char-
acterised Reaganomics in the United States happened at 
a slower pace in the EU. Actually, in the 1980s and 1990s 
the United States accused the European Union of not being 
sufficiently orientated towards efficiency in adjudicating 
competition matters. At the beginning of the 1980s, like 
many other countries in the world, the European Commu-
nity was shocked by a profound transformation in the way 
competition was conceived, regulated and reproduced by 
the Directorate General Competition (DG Comp), the Eu-
ropean term of reference, and national competition au-
thorities who acted as the territorial bodies in charge of 
constructing an efficient market. However, case law and 
discourse analysis proves that “its content, form and scope 
have become increasingly neoliberal in orientation.”18 If 
political decisions and ideology were the basis for the es-
tablishment of antitrust law at the end of the 1800s, almost 
one hundred years later another politically and ideologi-
cally driven political context defined the future trajectory 
of competition law, and laid the foundations for the main-
stream conception that is currently reproduced all over the 
EU. Interestingly, this shift in the pendulum towards ‘mar-
ket autonomy and efficient competition as an end in itself’ 
took place within the context of a legal framework that was 
virtually unchanged since the enactment of the European 
treaties. Thus, a political action in the opposite direction, 
led by civil society and policy makers, and supported by a 
deep understanding of the legal complexity of competition 
law, is not only desirable but also technically possible. 
Political will, legal awareness and broad sup-
port are today’s missing ingredients.
This brief historical reconstruction reveals that the origin of 
antitrust law in the West, and thus in the world, was taint-
ed by conflicting economic analyses and political choices: 
each solution had a particular distributive outcome and 
must be understood in its geo-political context. For exam-
ple, the Anglo-American School sees the main and sole 
purpose of competition policy as achieving economic ef-
ficiency, and therefore perceives any other consideration 
(environment, human rights, etc). as something external. 
Similarly, the German school adopts a ‘purist’ approach to 
competition law and suggests that the tools of competition 
should not be serving any political purpose but only that of 
competitive progress. The increase in relevance of the Chi-
cago school of thought, and the normalisation of market 
fundamentalism and neoclassical economic principles that 
took place in the second half of the 20th century, must be 
seen as an expression of specific dynamics and not as the 
crystallisation of natural events. The diffusion of post-Chi-
cago schools of thought on competition law, with academ-
ics and practitioners from different geographies, suggests 
that it is possible to structure and imagine a different com-
petition law for the 21st century. Some of the examples 
discussed in this report, such as the case of South Africa 
and the consideration of the employment implications of 
an acquisition involving Walmart, reveal that theory can 
also be put into practice. Yet, it requires challenging both 
the dominant mantra of competition law and the dogma 
of neoliberal economics where the market is efficient, busi-
ness is innovative, finance is infallible, the state is incom-
petent and the household, the earth, power and society 
do not matter.19 This report would like to be a step in the 
direction of a different way of conceiving competition and 
law within the relationship between people and the planet. 
Yet, no transformation in legal thinking and practice can be 
successful without the generation of strong and diffused 
political and social support.
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The word ‘competition’ refers to either the act of compet-
ing or the existence of a condition of rivalry in a certain en-
vironment. According to standard economics, people and 
firms compete for the acquisition of scarce resources, and 
this competition generates efficiencies in the form of low-
er prices and more choice. In other words, since resources, 
such as commodities, products and services are not in-
finite, and because mainstream economics see society as 
based on exclusions rather than cooperation, it is claimed 
that economics is about the ‘natural’ competition to obtain 
them. Based on this assumption, classical and neoclassi-
cal economic theories have tried to construe models to ex-
plain the ‘economic laws’ that steer competitive processes 
for the allocation of scarce resources, ultimately leading 
to efficient allocation of such resources. Their conclusion 
is that markets are self-regulating entities, responding to 
the laws of supply and demand, achieving optimal out-
comes for all the parties involved and, as a consequence, 
for the whole of society. Higher demand of a certain good 
will generate an increase in production to the optimal lev-
el, with prices being set accordingly. Hence, according to 
these theories, that have largely influenced the application 
and interpretation of current regulatory frameworks both 
in the EU and the United States, the government — that is 
seen as incompetent and incapable of achieving efficient 
outcomes — should not interfere with the distribution of re-
sources in society, for the market is the best ‘institution’ to 
allocate them. What follows is a brief recount of how these 
theories apply to competition law and policy.
Neoclassical theories use the concept of perfect competi-
tion, in which an almost infinite number of competitors sell 
goods and provide services as the background. This theo-
retical model relies on a number of assumptions: there is 
no information asymmetry, products are homogeneous, 
and markets are free from entry barriers. As a result, it is 
assumed that competition drives prices down to the mar-
ginal cost of production (which is the cost for producing an 
extra unit of the product sold). If indeed, all customers are 
rational decision-makers and firms are profit maximisers 
in a situation of perfect competition, in order to sell their 
goods, they will have to continuously compete for custom-
ers until the point where the price equals the marginal cost 
of production. 
Under these conditions, neoclassical economics affirms 
that when one of the competitors raises prices, customers 
immediately switch to other sellers — forcing this firm to re-
adjust prices to the market level (equilibrium price). 
Ultimately, perfect competition should generate allocative 
efficiency, in which the allocation of resources represents 
consumers’ preferences, thus ensuring low prices at the 
best conditions for consumers20. This model of perfect 
competition would demonstrate the self-regulating nature 
of the market, which — in theory — does not need the exter-
nal intervention of the regulator, as it is most efficient when 
it is left free. 
However, is this true in real markets? The theory relies on 
a number of assumptions that appear to be extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to replicate in real life: for example, 
that all market actors have rational preferences, that they 
are profit maximisers, and that they act independently on 
the basis of full and relevant information. However, in the 
real world, markets are imperfect, entry barriers may im-
pede the entry of new competitors, information may be 
available only to a few market participants and products 
may sometimes be difficult to compare. In addition, the 
real world is not only characterised by markets, states, fi-
nance, business and trade, but also by households, the 
planet, society, as the wealth of trust and reciprocity that 
keeps people together beyond exchange interactions,21 
the commons as resources that are nurtured, shared and 
reproduced (including the capacity of Nature to reproduce 
itself) and so on.
Moreover, competition may be distorted, thus preventing 
the market from reaching its optimal economic outcome. 
We know that in real markets firms may collude, thus 
avoiding competition, or one firm may gain a position of 
dominance and abuse this power. For instance, instead of 
competing against each other, producers may decide to 
create a cartel and fix higher prices for the goods they sell. 
This market failure will need the external intervention of 
the government — which in Europe means under the rules 
of competition law in Europe, or antitrust and anti-monop-
oly law in other jurisdictions. Finally, one should ask, what 
is this optimal economic equilibrium? As we will show in 
Chapter 3, even in the ‘perfect competition’ model, these 
theories do not question how resources are distributed, 
since they focus only on their ‘efficient allocation’22.
There is plenty of evidence that competition 
(even a ‘perfect one’) does not benefit everyone. 
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1  MARKET FAILURES 
Perfectly competitive markets, as already seen, are con-
sidered to be self-regulating entities able to reach a spon-
taneous ‘general equilibrium’. However, this condition 
may be prevented by a ‘market failure’, which might occur, 
in particular, in four cases.
Firstly, there are monopolies and cartels — in other words 
antitrust infringements. As already shown, these con-
structs aim to distort competition, thus impeding the es-
tablishment of a general equilibrium in the market.
Secondly, the equilibrium state may be distorted or pre-
vented by externalities. Usually, parties to an exchange 
bear the costs and benefits from the outcome of the deal. 
However, sometimes, the same exchange may bring about 
effects — positive or negative — for third parties. If the ef-
fects are positive, we talk about external benefits. For ex-
ample, the bees of a beekeeper pollinating the orchard 
of a neighbouring farmer26. An external cost or negative 
externality (also just called externality), is instead a mar-
ket failure, as it is a cost that spills over onto a third party. 
For example, consider a factory dumping waste in a river 
that flows downstream through a town. The citizens will 
have to bear the cost of cleaning up the river — a cost that 
was un-bargained for by them27. While the factory has 
calculated the mere cost of dumping, the cleaning costs 
and the possible health care costs due to the toxicity of 
the water generate a social marginal cost defined as “the 
sum of private marginal cost and the additional marginal 
costs involuntarily imposed on third parties by each unit 
of production”28.
Thirdly, economics generally describes a market failure 
regarding public goods. These are goods bearing two spe-
cific characteristics. Firstly, their consumption is ‘non-ri-
valrous’, which means that the consumption by one per-
son does not exclude the simultaneous consumption by 
another person. Secondly, nobody can be excluded from 
their use (so called non-excludability). For example, na-
tional defence, lighthouses, environmental protection, of-
ficial information goods (such as statistics and others) are 
all public goods that by definition do not pursue a profit 
maximising aim.
 Fourthly, the last case of market failure is severe informa-
tion asymmetry, which takes place when in an exchange 
one person has considerably less information than the 
other, to such an extent that the exchange is impeded or 
severely distorted in its outcome. Consider the case of a 
car seller who — not having any obligation to display infor-
mation to the buyer — sells a used car, which even though 
it looks in good condition to untrained eyes, is in fact a car 
that has several defects (a ‘lemon’ in US slang).29
On the contrary, the exploitation of farmworkers in Italy 
linked to online double-race auctions23 promoted by dis-
counts and large retailers (see Section 4 below) illustrates 
that competition is often suffered by workers, because 
competition exercises pressure on ‘the sphere of produc-
tion, and particularly labour, to deliver higher profitability, 
be it by higher productivity, longer working days or lower 
wages.24 If companies must be globally competitive in or-
der to survive, they have to cut costs. 
Another victim is the environment, with safe-
guards, precautionary measures and higher 
standards of production often sacrificed in the 
name of cheaper products that can be com-
petitively placed on the market.25 
2.1  EU Competition Law  
in a Nutshell
The system of EU competition law is the historical product 
of a series of internal and external transformations, includ-
ing the decentralisation of competence and the dialogue 
between Member States and the centre. The practical result 
was the construction of a legal framework that combines 
European institutions with national actors. At the European 
Uncompetitive people and non-competitive forms of pro-
tection of society and the environment are thus excluded 
by the global economy, left behind by the ‘winners’ of this 
selfish and destructive race.
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level, competition law is enacted by primary rules (the EU 
Treaties), secondary legislation (directives and regulations) 
and the European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice as the two bodies in charge of implementing com-
petition law at the EU level. At the national level, National 
Competition Authorities (NCAs) and courts are in charge 
of assessing and sanctioning anti-competitive behaviours 
that do not reach the ‘European threshold’. To offer some 
further details, Regulation 1/2003 established a decentral-
ised enforcement system in which National Competition 
Authorities directly apply EU competition law in addition 
to the European Commission (EC). At the same time, NCAs 
also apply national competition statutes, but when there 
is a conflict between EU and national competition law the 
former prevails (Article 3(2)).30 
The decision to introduce the fundamental 
rules of competition in the EU Treaties (on hor- 
izontal and vertical agreements, abuse of 
dominant position and state aid) is not only a  
sign of the centrality and importance that 
com petition played in the vision of the common 
market, but is also a legal constraint for fur-
ther change of the EU laws. 
As we discuss in this report, it is true that the treaties and 
the rest of the regulatory framework leave some space for 
a vision of competition law that is less subordinated to 
the principles of neoliberalism. However, a radical reform 
of the framework would thus require a redefinition of the 
Treaties, i.e. a coordinated and agreed effort by all Member 
States.
The current system of EU competition law is designed 
around the general objective of preventing market distor-
tions caused by anticompetitive behaviours. Competition 
law aims, therefore, to ensure that businesses are compet-
ing fairly, by offering goods and services that are always 
cheaper, of better quality and more diverse. In particular, 
competition law includes provisions against cartels (hori-
zontal agreements) and abuses of dominance (see Sections 
2.1.2 and 4.2). These two sets of provisions are formulat-
ed as prohibitions of specific behaviours and, similarly to 
criminal laws, punish the infringer after the violation has 
taken place. The European Commission for infringements 
of EU relevance and the National Competition Authorities 
for those of domestic relevance, have the power to enforce 
these laws. In addition, the EU Merger Regulation31 allows 
both to prohibit all concentrations of power that may pose 
a threat to free competition in the EU. 
The gist of EU competition laws can be found in Articles 
101-108 TFEU32 and in the Merger Regulation. All business-
es have to respect these laws and consequences for their 
infringement can be very severe: hefty fines, orders to di-
vest part of the business and modification of contracts or 
of other behaviours, are just some examples. Because of 
the importance of anti-competitive agreements, abuse of 
dominant position and regulation on mergers, this chapter 
briefly explains the functioning of these legal provisions in 
EU law. The discipline of State Aid, enshrined in art. 107 ss. 
of the TFEU, is discussed in chapter IV with regard to its di-
rect relevance for the food chain.
2.1.1  ART. 101 TFEU: ANTICOMPETITIVE  
AGREEMENTS
Cartels and other anticompetitive agreements are consid-
ered to be the most serious type of infringement of com-
petition law. Companies partaking in a cartel agree not to 
compete, depriving consumers from the benefits of fair 
market competition. Antitrust laws target these agree-
ments vehemently because, by their very nature (some-
times in competition law terms expressed with ‘per se’ or 
‘by object’), they distort, prevent or restrict competition in 
the market. 
For example, in 2015 the European Commission fined eight 
manufacturers and two distributors of retail food packag-
ing trays a total of €115.865.000 for having fixed prices and 
allocated customers. In other words, the companies agreed 
upon the selling prices of their trays and packaging. More-
over, they committed not to sell or advertise their products 
in the geographic area assigned to other members of the 
cartel, therefore dividing the European market in order to 
avoid any possibility of having to compete against each 
other for a client. Besides these textbook cases of restric-
tions by object, it is possible that the collusion is not by its 
very nature injurious to competition but has anyway ad-
verse effects on competition in the internal market. For ex-
ample, in the case of the tractor manufacturer, John Deere, 
which created a UK registry where information on tractor 
sales was shared. The European Court of Justice found out 
that the registry had the effect of softening competition by 
reducing uncertainty and created a barrier for the entry of 
new competitors that did not want to share the same infor
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But let us describe this provision in a little more detail. Ar-
ticle 101 (1) TFEU prohibits any agreement between busi-
nesses having as their object, or effect the prevention, re-
striction or distortion of competition within the European 
internal market37. This provision, therefore, prohibits any 
market conduct fulfilling the following conditions:
a Existence of a cooperation in the form of:
i an agreement between independent undertakings;
ii a decision of, by or within an association of under-
takings;
iii a concerted practice between independent under-
takings;
b coordination of market behaviour of the undertakings;
c coordination having as their object, or effect, the pre-
vention, restriction or distortion of competition; and
d having an appreciable effect on trade between Member 
States.
2  ARTICLE 101(3) TFEU
In the current EU legal framework, it is exceptionally pos-
sible to exempt an anticompetitive agreement or an abuse 
of dominance33 from the application of competition laws. 
Article 101(3) establishes that any agreement “which 
contributes to improving the production or distribution 
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, 
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting bene-
fit” is not punished according to the paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
the same article, if the agreement does not:
“(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these 
objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminat-
ing competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question”.
The object of Article 101(3) is therefore an agreement, 
which is, in principle, anticompetitive, according to Article 
101 (1). However, Article 101(3) allows a balancing of effi-
ciencies produced by this anticompetitive agreement with 
its anticompetitive effects. If the efficiencies outweigh the 
inefficiencies, the agreement will survive competition law 
scrutiny.
But what kind of efficiencies do the Commission consider? 
The present Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) 
TFEU34 examine in particular four cumulative conditions 
for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU:
a The agreement must contribute to improving the pro-
duction or distribution of goods or contribute to pro-
moting technical or economic progress;
b Consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting 
benefits;
c The restrictions must be indispensable to the attain-
ment of these objectives; and finally
d The agreement must not afford the parties the possi-
bility of eliminating competition in respect of a sub-
stantial part of the products in question.
The objective of these four conditions being the creation of 
efficiencies at consumer level that allow the offer of cheap-
er or better products, so compensating for the adverse ef-
fects of the restriction of competition. Although having a 
non-binding nature, these Guidelines are of fundamental 
importance. The Guidelines therefore embrace a particu-
larly narrow interpretation of Article 101(3), one in which 
only economic efficiency is considered. Hence, it has been 
observed that while Article 101(1) is concerned with alloc-
ative efficiency, Article 101(3) may provide a justification if 
the agreement improves productive efficiency.35 However, 
this perspective fails to include social and environmental 
efficiencies, such as the restriction of sales of ‘cheap’ alco-
hol or unhealthy food, and the usage of environmentally 
unfriendly plastic bags in supermarkets36. But this situation 
is not immutable, as the law itself is not narrow in itself and 
leaves room for a different, more extensive, interpretation. 
 
mation. In other words, the agreement — although not be-
ing per se anticompetitive — had anticompetitive effects on 
the internal market and had to be accordingly sanctioned. 
The anticompetitive agreement can take any form; written, 
oral, or can even consist of a mere ‘concerted practice’.
EU law encapsulates cartel prohibition in just one provi-
sion, Article 101 TFEU, comprising three paragraphs: 1) the 
first paragraphs details the type and the limits of the prohi-
bition; 2) the second paragraph describes the consequenc-
es of such an infringement; 3) paragraph 3 offers a possibil-
ity to cartelists to defend themselves by showing that the 
cartel is actually beneficial to the market.
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The concept of agreement covers not only formal and le-
gally binding contracts but also informal, non-enforceable 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’. 
The typical scenario includes a number of firms 
agreeing to fix prices or quantities of their 
goods or services, avoiding therefore to com-
pete. Competition law’s scrutiny is not limited 
to anticompetitive agreements, as virtually 
all jurisdictions also punish anticompetitive 
concerted practices. 
Firms do not necessarily need to conclude an agreement 
to violate Article 101 TFEU, as, for instance, alignment of 
market behaviours in order to distort competition in the 
market would be sufficient to determine the existence of 
an anticompetitive agreement. 
In order to be sanctioned, the agreement has to cause a 
prevention, restriction or distortion to the competition in 
the relevant market. The consequence of this violation will 
be to declare the agreement void as established in Article 
101 (2) TFEU38. Additionally, the European Commission 
and the National Competition Authorities have the power 
to impose fines and order behavioural and structural reme-
dies on the undertakings partaking to the cartel.
2.1.2  ART. 102 TFEU: ABUSE OF  
DOMINANT POSITION
Cartels need, by definition, more than one firm 
to exist and operate. But this does not mean 
that market distortions can be caused only by 
anticompetitive agreements. 
There are situations in which one firm alone is able to gen-
erate similar distortive effects in the market. This is gener-
ally due to the fact that the firm is in a position of domi-
nance and has abused this power, excluding competitors or 
exploiting consumers and other competitors. For example, 
in 1978 the European Court of Justice confirmed a decision 
of the European Commission fining United Brands (UBC), 
one of the major producers of bananas in the world. UBC 
was found to have charged excessive prices and imposed 
unjustified conditions for the distribution and ripening of 
its bananas. Although there were other banana producers, 
the EC found that UBC was able to behave independently 
from its competitors, forcing distributors to accept unfa-
vourable conditions for the supply of bananas and artifi-
cially raising the prices at consumer level.
3  POWERS OF THE COMMISSION: 
BEHAVIOURAL AND STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that where the 
Commission has found an infringement of competition 
law, it can impose behavioural or structural remedies to 
make sure that the infringement and the market distor-
tion effectively come to an end.
a) Behavioural remedies
A behavioural remedy is an order directed to an antitrust 
infringer to do something (positive) or not to do some-
thing (negative) in order to mend the market distortions 
created, and prevent the future distorting effects by the 
same conduct. Take, for instance, the case in which a 
dominant undertaking infringed competition laws by 
refusing to deal with another undertaking. Here, the 
Commission can order the infringer to supply the victim 
of this abuse of dominance39. Differently, in the case of 
a violation of Article 101 TFEU, the Commission has no 
power to order the infringing undertakings to supply 
someone, because Article 101 doesn’t address refusals 
to supply and it empowers the EC to sanction the nullity 
of an agreement, not to create a new agreement40.
b) Structural remedies
In its arsenal, the EC also has the power to order chang-
es to the structure of undertakings that infringe compe-
tition laws. Article 7 (1) Regulation 1/2003 subordinates 
the adoption of structural remedies in the absence of 
behavioural ones. Hence, the EC is allowed to resort to 
structural remedies only if there is no equally effective 
behavioural remedy. 
For instance, the Commission may order the divestment 
of assets. It may proceed against a vertically integrated 
firm that anticompetitively refuses to give access to an 
essential facility, or it may order a spin-off of an anticom-
petitive joint venture.
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2.1.3  EU MERGER REGULATION 139/2004
In addition to the provisions on anticompetitive agree-
ments and abuse of dominance, EU competition law in-
cludes a third pillar — merger control. Business organisa-
tions may change the nature of their competitive position 
by merging or acquiring the ownership of other firms or 
their operating units. 
Mergers and acquisitions entail the consoli-
dation or acquisition of assets of two legal enti - 
ties into one entity (already existing or new). 
Merger control regimes aim to impede the formation of a 
concentration restricting competition in the market. In this 
vein, the EU Merger Regulation 139/200443 (‘EUMR’) sets 
out procedural rules allowing the European Commission to 
decide whether to clear or block concentrations having an 
EU-dimension. The EUMR addresses those mergers leading 
to the creation or reinforcement of a dominant position, 
which is likely to bring about a surge in prices for consum-
ers, lower quality of products and services, reduce choice, 
or limit innovation. 
Differently from Article 101 and 102 TFEU, the 
merger control takes place ex ante, thus aim-
ing to prevent the formation of concentrations 
potentially detrimental to competition. 
This means that the competent antitrust authority has to 
decide whether to give the green light to the merger (un-
conditional clearance decision)44, accept it with commit-
ments (conditional clearance decision)45, or prohibit it, if 
the merger is incompatible with the internal market46. Like 
the approach of Articles 101 and 102, the EUMR does not 
explicitly consider public policy interest that may encroach 
on the enforcement of competition law. Competitors adopt 
a wide range of activities in the market and their behav-
iours may affect the competitive process, and ultimately 
consumers, in many different ways. Consequently, how do 
we decide when a market distortion deserves the attention 
of the Authority or when instead it is not within the scope of 
competition law? For many, this question can be answered 
only if one clearly defines the aim or purpose of competi-
tion law.
Article 102 TFEU, prohibits this type of behaviour. It de-
scribes a scenario under which there is a dominant under-
taking, which has the power to behave independently from 
other market forces and abuses its power, by preventing, 
restricting or distorting, competition in the relevant mar-
ket. 
In particular, Article 102 establishes a number of conditions 
for the finding of such an abuse:
a one or more undertakings hold a dominant position in 
a certain relevant market;
b the dominance relates to the internal market or a sub-
stantial part of it;
c there is an abuse of this position of dominance;
d there is an actual or potential effect on trade between 
Member States.
If this dominant player abuses its power — dis-
torting the competitive process in its relevant 
market — competition law will intervene with a 
set of remedies very similar to the ones seen 
for cartels.
All these anticompetitive behaviours have to be performed 
by ‘undertakings’. Competition law rules (Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU) refer, indeed, as the subject of their provisions, 
to ‘undertakings’ which are not necessarily companies, as 
this concept also encompasses associations, cooperatives, 
and professional regulatory bodies, whether or not the en-
tity has a legal personality or a corporate form41. Neither 
the term ‘undertaking’ nor the concept of economic unit 
are defined by European law, not even in ‘soft law’ provi-
sions. The EU courts have however defined the undertaking 
as an ‘economic entity’ “regardless of the legal status of the 
entity or the way in which it is financed”42.
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while competition law takes care of strictly defined market 
failures, it is for other branches of law to tackle other mar-
ket failures or other externalities that are generated by the 
same market behaviours. Tax law, for instance, will solve 
problems of distributive justice, while special statutes will 
offer remedies to environmental damage and job losses. 
But is this true from a comparative institutional analysis 
perspective? In other words, is this neat division between 
market and non-market institutions going to solve market 
failures created by competitive distortions? For instance, 
will environmental law stop a merger that threatens to re-
duce biodiversity by combining two of the main seed pro-
ducers? 
In the case of the European Union — and this is relevant for 
the final part of this report —, Protocol 27 on the internal 
market and competition and the European Court of Justice 
have made clear that competition rules are part of the in-
ternal market rules and are therefore necessary to achieve 
the aims of the internal market more generally.50 If this is 
the case, the analysis of EU competition law and its objec-
tives should not be separated from the broader goals of the 
European Union: even in the present context, competition 
is not an end in itself but a means to build what article 3 of 
the Treaty on the European Union defines as a ‘social mar-
ket economy’. 
The notion of a ‘social market economy’ re-
placed the expression ‘open market economy 
with free competition’ that was included in  
the former Article 4(1) of the Treaty of the Euro- 
pean Community. 
Because words matter, especially when they are concre-
tised in legal texts and international agreements, we must 
thus consider that competition law has become a tool in 
the hands of national authorities and courts to achieve 
goals and public interests that go beyond that of creating 
an effective competitive structure.51
3   What is Competition  
Law For (According to the 
Mainstream Vision)?
There have been many attempts to define the past and 
present competition policy aims. Dealing with the behav-
iour of firms in the market, competition law is potentially a 
far-reaching legal instrument. And strict definitions hardly 
capture the multiform nature of this policy instrument. Tes-
tament to this, is also the fact that the goals of competition 
law have changed over time in virtually all jurisdictions. 
However, more than ever in the last thirty years, scholars 
and practitioners have started to engage in heated debates 
on the scope of competition law, in what has already been 
defined as a ‘battle for the soul of antitrust.’47 The bone 
of contention is represented by the neoclassical vision of 
competition law and economics, which deeply affected the 
application of antitrust laws in the United States and influ-
enced the interpretation of these legal instruments in the 
rest of the world.
As Section 1 of this report has explained, after WWII and 
until the late 1960s, the Harvard school of thought, with 
its structure-conduct-performance paradigm, determined 
the policy approach to antitrust enforcement in the United 
States, favouring the intervention of the authorities in order 
to restore the competitive structure of the market. Highly 
critical of the continuous intrusion of the public authorities 
in the market, the Chicago school (in particular Professor 
Robert Bork, Judge Posner, and Judge Easterbrook) advo-
cated for the adoption of the more ‘neutral’ (neo)classical 
economic theories48 which, according to their view,, would 
allow for the intervention of the antitrust authority only 
as an extrema ratio, when the market is inefficient in the 
allocation of resources. The guiding principle became the 
consumer welfare standard, in particular, calculated by the 
monitoring of price levels. In the EU, this trend more recent-
ly translated into buzzwords such as ‘consumer welfare’ or 
‘more economic approach’49, which — if loosely interpret-
ed — both intend to vest competition law enforcement us-
ing a more economically informed approach. “What about 
the distribution of the resources”? one may ask. And does 
this approach consider other market failures, such as dam-
age to the environment or job displacement? 
Allocative efficiency, disregards distributive justice and 
market failures not related to those few preselected crite-
ria. However, some economists explain, this is for the best. 
According to the mainstream approach to competition law, 
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“Historically, competition law and anti-trust law exists 
as one method of ensuring that markets function in a 
way that benefits citizens and limits the ability of corpo-
rations to externalise costs on to government. So, intro-
ducing additional considerations about well-being, lob-
bying ability, and other impacts of concentration would 
indeed require regulators and policy-makers to consider 
more variables, but at least some of these may be varia-
bles that they understand better than the current infor-
mation on which decisions are based.”58
As recognised by the European Commission too: “…com-
petition policy cannot be pursued in isolation, as an end 
in itself, without reference to the legal, economic, political 
and social context.”59 Recently, an ideological battle has 
begun to determine the limits of competition law and pol-
icy, in particular with relation to the application of other 
public policy concerns.
According to some scholars, competition law has a ‘sponge’ 
and ‘membrane’ composition, which “acknowledges that 
the effects of the domestic environment are an integral 
part of competition law and are echoed in the properties 
of the law. In doing so it points to the margin for subjective, 
or at times, arbitrary decision making that may be shielded 
under the perceived structure of the law and the legitimacy 
of economic analysis.”60 Others, instead, posit that while 
the economic welfare approach is inherently flawed, find-
ing the goals of competition law does not solve the prob-
lem of what institution is the best placed to solve a specific 
problem. In this case, Lianos advocates, comparative in-
stitutional analysis should inform the choices of decision 
makers and in particular the selection of the ‘least imper-
fect alternative’ institution.61 In the words of one of ours 
interviewees, “EU competition policy is legally required to 
integrate e.g. environmental protection, to explicitly reject 
such consideration is liable to annulment by the courts”62 
(See Box 11 on the history of Art 11 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union). 
National and European competition author- 
ities, including the European Court of Justice, 
should thus approach competition law cases 
to solve both issues related to anticompetitive 
behaviours and other public policy concerns, 
only if it is the best placed institution.
3.1  EU Competition Law’s 
Objectives and Goals
For the traditional antitrust enforcement mantra, compe-
tition authorities should consider only the economic con-
cerns related to the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition, which are not to be weighed against public 
interest concerns, of any kind52. For the supporters of this 
position, balancing competition goals with other interests 
“has the potential to have a significant adverse effect on 
legal certainty (among other things)”. In their opinion, “en-
vironmental and sustainability goals are better served via 
separate macro-level policy (e.g. emissions targets, animal 
welfare standards, etc”.)53.
According to this position the guiding principles and objec-
tives of antitrust have to be limited to consumer welfare54. 
This standard assumes that competition law should be 
enforced to the benefit of consumers only, meaning that 
antitrust should intervene only when market distortions 
are detrimental to consumers, in terms of prices, and more 
moderately, choice and innovation. 
For others, competition law enforcement and competition 
policy entail the application, or at least the consideration, 
of a number of different policy aims. In other words, for 
some it is important to understand if, and to what extent, 
competition law is ‘permeable’ to the penetration of oth-
er public interest concerns,55 and which public interest 
concerns — over the years — have been legally associated 
to specific competition policy aims. Thinkers and practi-
tioners all over the world are opening up to a more holistic 
and systemic understanding of competition law, and they 
claim that “uncertainty surrounding the application of cer-
tain provisions (such as Art. 101(3) TFEU) in contexts where 
non-economic goals are pursued should be dispelled so 
that the current uncertainty should not serve as an excuse 
against the inclusion of public goals in the activities of un-
dertakings.”56
For these authors, competition law has never been applied 
in a vacuum, since many different objectives have charac-
terised its policies and enforcement, from the promotion 
of efficiency and consumer welfare; to the protection of 
market structure and economic freedom; to the core mar-
ket values of the EU — in primis market integration.57 On the 
contrary, 
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4  CONSUMERS AT THE CENTRE OF THE (COMPETITION) WORLD
The recent past has seen a visible surge in the importance 
of the consumer welfare standard at the European Com-
mission. In 2005, Competition Commissioner stated that 
“Consumer welfare is now well established as the 
standard the Commission applies when assessing 
mergers and infringements of the Treaty rules on car-
tels and monopolies. Our aim is simple: to protect com-
petition in the market as a means of enhancing con-
sumer welfare and ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources”65.
However, consumer welfare is not a statement of facts or 
an exact science. It is indeed subject to interpretation as 
are many other concepts. Neoclassical economic price 
theory tends to define consumer welfare in a narrow way, 
so that consumers are merely buyers of goods and their 
welfare mainly corresponds to the price they have to pay 
for that product or service.
If we were to adopt a slightly broader approach, we may 
consider that other possible conditions are detrimental to 
consumers, such as the lower quality of the goods sold, 
less choice, and less innovation. 
If the category of ‘price’ does not offer a lot of space for 
intellectual and legal manoeuvre, the notions of quality 
and innovation, on the other hand, may provide interest-
ing hooks to bring to the fore considerations that do not 
directly affect consumers’ pockets but may have a bene-
ficial impact on the non-consumer actors (e.g. workers) 
and the environment. If we were to adopt an even broad-
er attitude towards consumers’ welfare, we would realise 
that they do not represent a homogeneous and uniform 
category and we therefore should take into consideration 
their desires, aspirations, morals, ethical orientations and 
behaviours. However, we may also have to ask if the plan-
etary and social emergencies that affect our planet are 
compatible with an interpretation of competition law that 
unquestionably posits the consumers and the act of con-
sumption at the centre. 
At the current stage of global value chains and intercon-
nected planetary challenges, there is little doubt that the 
adoption of better social and environmental practices, like 
remunerative prices leading to a living income for farmers, 
or the ban on aggressive pesticides, could generate signifi-
cant benefits that are not directly internalised by consum-
ers. The fact that the overall quantity of positive external-
ities that is generated by better coordinated practices is 
not taken into consideration is a political choice that inev-
itably creates a bias in favour of competition. True, the last 
part of para 85 of the EC Guidelines states that: “society as 
a whole benefits where the efficiencies lead either to few-
er resources being used to produce the output consumed 
or to the production of more valuable products and thus 
to a more efficient allocation of resources.” However, the 
recognition of the overall societal benefit has not man-
aged to become mainstream thinking and overtake the 
consumers-based approach.
In the end, and on a practical examination of the facts, 
competition law has always been subject to legal and eco-
nomic analysis, as well as to policy objectives.63 Often-
times, the most complex cases were exactly those in which 
it was harder to strike a balance among these three forces. 
Abundant case law is testament to this, such as the Havil-
land case64 and the many others we use and analyse in this 
report. To understand this aspect of antitrust, one has to 
firstly remember that competition law itself is a public in-
terest concern, as it serves markets and society as a whole. 
In the next chapter we consider therefore this aspect, pon-
dering the possibility to weigh competition law against oth-
er public interest concerns.
3   What is Competition  Law For
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for standardised products and the competition between 
farmers, with an impact on biodiversity, labour conditions 
and the interaction with the environment. 
A traditional competition law-based approach to the food 
chain means, therefore, to engage with the distribution of 
power along the chain, both vertically and horizontally, 
and investigate the way in which market dynamics deter-
mine price, availability, research and development and 
the general well-being of consumers. Moreover, it means 
accepting the territorial limits of competition law and 
struggling with the “systemic gap in the capacity of nations 
(sic) states to address the competitive behaviour of firms 
operating across national boundaries.”70 On the contrary, 
a holistic approach to competition law in the food system 
would be such as to enquire about the consequences that 
market share and the concentration of power play through-
out the value chains beyond a rigid economic approach.71 
Moreover, it would mean to fully integrate matters of pub-
lic interest (biodiversity, nutritional content of the diet, 
sustainability, workers’ and animal rights) and recognise 
that they are not external to the market and competition. 
Furthermore, it would require thinking about the long-
term socio-environmental implications of competition de-
cisions, including the risk of strengthening conventional 
agriculture, the disappearance of small-scale farming, the 
power imbalance created by unfair contractual practices, 
the adoption of agro-ecological practices, and the emission 
of green-house gases, etc.
In the last years, the panorama of the global food system 
has been transformed by a series of acquisitions, mergers, 
joint ventures and consolidations that have significantly re-
shaped it. In response, numerous reports, policy briefs and 
academic papers have been produced that aim to assess 
the competitive implications of a shrinking global food sys-
tem. The common denominator of these reflections is the 
way in which the concentration of shares and market has 
been happening at all levels of the food chain (from land to 
the restaurant sector)72 and that mainstream competition 
law has not been capable of providing adequate tools to 
assess and redress worrisome non-market considerations. 
In particular, a 2017 report by IPES-Food focused on the 
sectors of seeds and agrochemicals; fertilisers; livestock 
genetics; animal pharmaceuticals; farm machinery; agri-
4   The Socio-Environmental 
Unsustainability of the Food 
System: a Competition 
Law Assessment 
Small-scale food producers are responsible for most of the 
food consumed in the world and most of the investments 
made in agriculture. This is particularly the case in the 
Global South, where an estimated 500 million smallholder 
farms support almost 2 billion people. In Asia and sub-Sa-
haran Africa, to provide two examples, 80 percent of the 
food is produced through non-conventional and non-in-
dustrialised agriculture.66 Most of this food is consumed 
locally and contributes to food and nutrition security. How-
ever, it cannot be forgotten that large-scale agriculture is 
replacing smallholders and that an increasing amount of 
the food produced by small-scale farmers is integrated into 
long and complex supply chains that often connect land in 
the Global South with cities all over the world (mainly in 
the Global North and the affluent developing economies). 
Behind fish, that represented the most traded food in the 
world in terms of value in 2014, long distance chains are 
particularly important not only for products like coffee and 
cocoa (whose value chains are evident legacies of its co-
lonial past, and can be produced both in plantations and 
small-scale plots), but also soybean, wheat, palm oil and 
corn that are produced on large-scale monocultures and 
shipped throughout the planet to satisfy the needs of hu-
man beings, animals and incinerators.67
One characteristic of long food chains, already 
highlighted by Harriet Friedman in 1994,68  
is the expansion of distance, both geographical  
and in terms of democratic control over the 
food chain. 
This has the effect of increasing the instability of the food 
system, but also its complexity as a multi-layered system 
with the intervention of multiple jurisdictions. While the 
multi-territoriality and length of the chains may be an ad-
vantage in terms of multiplication of spaces of intervention, 
it is also the case that they increase the cost of doing busi-
ness and provide an incentive to consolidation, homoge-
nisation and financialisation.69 The longer the chain, the 
more coordination is needed and the more important it is 
to have the ability to invest in order to reach economies of 
scale: the emergence of lead firms and the intensification 
of capital-intensive food chains are only two of the conse-
quences of the transformation of the food system. In addi-
tion, long-chains that feed consumers (or livestock or en-
gines) far away from production are intensifying the need 
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culture commodity traders; food and beverage processors, 
and food retailers.73 To these, we could add the area of pre-
cision farming and big data, the problem with horizontal 
ownership by financial institutions (pension funds, private 
equity funds, insurance funds, etc). However, a holistic ap-
proach to competition law and the food chain would not 
be satisfactory to address the issues of concentrations and 
consolidations.74 On the contrary, in order to attempt to 
change competition law and use it to move the food system 
away from the current socio-environmental unsustainabil-
ity, it would be important to discuss areas such as horizon-
tal agreements and state aid, often left at the margin of the 
analysis but particularly relevant when it comes to thinking 
of pro-actively improving the food system rather than reac-
tively responding to its dynamics.  In the following pages, 
we discuss a) concentration in the retail sector (4.1); b) ac-
quisitions in the seeds and fertiliser sector (4.5); c) horizon-
tal agreements (4.6); d) sugar taxes, state aid and dumping 
(4.4), as four areas of particular interest for the present and 
future of competition law. 
4.1  Increasing Concentration 
in the Retail Sector
Consolidation of food supply is increasing and 
more evident at every step of the food chain, 
from farm to fork. This impacts not only farm-
ers and businesses, but also consumers in the 
form of reduced consumer choices and higher 
grocery prices. 
Of particular interest is the consolidation that is taking 
place at the level of supermarkets and retailers.75 As a mat-
ter of fact, in Europe they tend to have a powerful position 
in the food supply chain because they are often the single 
most important food retail outlet.76 In 11 different Euro-
pean countries, fewer than eight retail chains control the 
vast majority of the nation’s food retail. For example, five 
retailers made up 85 percent of the German market in 2014 
and 77 percent of the Dutch market in 2016. Retail is also 
continuously concentrating in most European countries. 
The merger between Sainsbury’s and ASDA (owned by 
Wal-Mart) that was announced in late April is just the last 
in a long list of cases of concentration and consolidation of 
logistics and retail spaces (Box 5).77
Along with the possible abuse of dominant position that 
may lead to increasing prices, reduction of availability, 
unfair practices and reduction of consumers’ well-being 
(sanctioned by Article 102 of the TFEU),78 the concentrat-
The increase in retailers’ market share does not impact 
competition and contractual practices only. On the con-
trary, there is little doubt that consolidation, international 
and national buying groups and other forms of integration 
can have a significant impact on the structure of the over-
all food chain, including in terms of survival of small-scale 
farming, labour conditions, the foreclosure of local grocery 
stores and the environmental implications connected to a 
shift towards long value chains. These ‘non-market’ exter-
nalities have seldom been under the spotlight of competi-
tion authorities. On the contrary, they are often tagged as 
external to the scope of antitrust law and relegated into the 
sphere of the ‘political’. 
An interesting exception, although in our opinion still an 
incomplete solution that would have required the possi-
bility for the court to assume a longer-term approach and 
embed socio-environmental considerations as an integral 
part of the decision rather than a justification for a medi-
ation, is represented by the intervention of the South Afri-
can Supreme Court in the case of Walmart’s acquisition of 
Massmart in 2012.79 Massmart was a national retailer with 
a market share of 25% that did not pose any direct threat in 
terms of substantially preventing or reducing competition. 
On the contrary, both the Tribunal and the Court of Appeal 
adopted a consumer-based approach and recognised that 
the acquisition would lower prices. However, the court pro-
posed an innovative interpretation of Competition Act No. 
89/1998 in order to expand its vision and consider the ef-
fects the merger would have had on Massmart’s local sup-
pliers, especially SMEs, which could have been substituted 
by Walmart’s international suppliers.80 
After having required the opinion of non-mainstream econ-
omists, the court leveraged Section 12A of the Act and the 
fact that it recognises public interest grounds as an obsta-
cle to mergers and acquisition. Operating within a legal 
framework that resembles that of the TEU and TFEU, the 
Court decided to mitigate its pro-consumers decision with 
the introduction of a temporary pro-SMEs’ fund to be fi-
nanced by Walmart and to be disbursed in order to allevi-
ate “the risks to micro, small and medium-sized producers 
of South African products caused, or which may be caused, 
by Massmart’s merger with Wal-Mart.”81 
ed status of the European retail sector and their increase in 
power trigger at least three kinds of concerns: a) accumula-
tion and abuse of bargaining power deriving from mergers 
and acquisitions; b) establishment of international buying 
groups and contract-based concentrations; c) the redefini-
tion of the whole food system, in particular upstream.
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A few years down the road, the jury is still out on the impact 
of the mergers on small-producers and the South African 
food system: however, the example represents one of the 
most progressive attempts by a competition authority to 
engage with material or potential changes in retail power. 
In particular, the court tried to use existing legal tools to 
redefine the boundaries between market and non-market 
considerations, although within the context of consumers’ 
well-being and the priority of price considerations.84
4.2  Abuse of Superior Bargaining 
Power and Unfair Trading Practices
Unsurprisingly, power is distributed unevenly in supply 
chains. But, this is not — per se — a reason for the law to 
intervene. To a certain extent, power imbalances are con-
sidered as normal factors in contract law, competition law, 
and the other regulatory tools dealing with unfair trading 
practices (UTPs). However, when the party enjoying a po-
sition of superior bargaining power uses this advantage to 
impose unconscionable or unfair conditions on other mar-
ket participants, either of the regulatory solutions should 
be applied. It has been long discussed which law should 
be applied, as these abusive market behaviours have some 
characteristics (but not all) of contractual breaches for un-
conscionability or economic duress, and some characteris-
tic (but again not fully) typical of abuses of dominance. The 
result being that — more often than not — such behaviours 
have been left unpunished and even unchecked.
At a scholarly level, this issue has been mainly addressed 
through the lens of contract law and consists in “regulat-
ing the contest between contracting parties and ensuring 
a relatively equalised landscape of bargaining capacity, 
bargaining power being interpreted as the interplay of the 
parties’ actual power relationship in an exchange trans-
action.”85 The impact of buyer power on the structure of 
supply chains has been well documented86. For example, 
empirical studies have demonstrated that dominant UK 
grocery retailers pass on to Kenyan producers the cost of 
compliance with their private standards on hygiene, food 
safety and traceability and this has resulted in food produc-
tion shifting from smallholders to large farms, often owned 
by the exporters, as well as the acquisition by such ex-
porters of their own production capacity.87 As already dis-
cussed by Olivier De Schutter back in 2010, “In short, small 
farmers are being kicked off global grocery supply chains, 
often leading to increased rural poverty.”88 Within a context 
of transnational economic imbalances, some support may 
be provided by contract law. 
5  THE SAINSBURY/ASDA MERGER 
AND THE DISMISSAL OF NON-
COMPETITION RELATED ISSUES
On 30 April 2018, J Sainsbury PLC and ASDA Group Limit-
ed announced that they had entered into an agreement 
to combine their operations. In the UK, it is the respon-
sibility of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) 
to consider whether it is or may be the case that the 
Proposed Merger, if carried into effect, will result in the 
creation of a relevant merger situation under the merger 
provisions of the Enterprise Act 2002 and, if so, whether 
the creation of that situation may be expected to result 
in a substantial lessening of competition within any mar-
ket or markets in the United Kingdom (UK) for goods or 
services. The CMA issued a preliminary invitation to com-
ment asking all interested parties to submit to them any 
initial views on the impact of the proposed merger. The 
responses to the inquiry raise interesting issues in terms 
of effects beyond the efficiency-framework of contem-
porary competition law. In particular, some submissions 
raised concerns about the effect that the proposed merg-
er could have on employment or the effect that any store 
closures could have on the communities they serve (in-
cluding making it more difficult for vulnerable members 
of society to do their shopping). Others raised concerns 
regarding the effect of the proposed merger on practic-
es within the supply chain, including in relation to food 
provenance, labour conditions and environmental con-
siderations. As a matter of fact, Sainsbury’s has made it 
clear that if its proposed takeover of Asda is given the go-
ahead from competition regulators, it will target its big-
gest suppliers for cost reductions by flexing its increased 
buying power.82 However, the response of the CMA fully 
reproduced the dominant perspective. In its words, “[w]
hen investigating a merger, the CMA’s mandate, by law, 
relates to assessing the potential impact of that merger 
on competition. This assessment is critical in ensuring 
that consumers are able to benefit from the lower prices, 
better service, or greater choice that effective competi-
tion is able to bring about. Assessing the other poten-
tial effects of a merger, such as the impact that a merg-
er could have on employment, falls outside the CMA’s 
statutory powers.”83 We consider the narrowness of the 
approach and the lack of any reference to increased bar-
gaining power, public interest considerations and gener-
al economic well-being particularly worrisome. We hope 
this document may invite further and broader scrutiny 
on the implications of the merger. 
EU Competition Law and Sustainability in Food Systems
24 
Outside the bubble of competition law, something has 
been done. For example, the EU Commission in April 2018 
advanced the proposal for a directive on unfair trading 
practices in the food chain that addresses some of the main 
concerns raised in terms of party autonomies, economic 
dependency, imposition of unfair conditions and the like.89 
From the point of view of competition law, how- 
ever, there are only a few authors who have 
suggested that competition law should adopt a 
holistic approach to value chains and address 
the issue.90 
The holistic approach advocated by Lianos and Lombardi 
claims that the usual legal and economic analysis of firms’ 
behaviour in the market should be integrated within con-
tractual and socio-economic considerations that look at 
the whole food chain and at the long-term implications 
that a change in the distribution of power may have on 
all the actors (including those several tiers away from the 
retailer).91 On the convergence between contract law and 
competition law, the Italian legislator introduced Article 62 
of the law 27/2012 which defines unfair trading practices 
and also provides the Italian Antitrust Authority (ICA) with 
the power to punish conduct resulting in “an unwarranted 
exercise of bargaining power on the demand side at the ex-
pense of suppliers.”92 Therefore, in addition to its power to 
intervene in cases of abuses of dominant position, the ICA 
can now intervene in commercial relationships of a vertical 
nature in the agro-food industry, even in the absence of a 
dominant position, provided that the contract produces an 
appreciable adverse effect on the market. However, the ef-
fectiveness of the rule has yet to be proved and the list of 
unfair and illegal practices appears incapable of embracing 
all the ways in which power imbalances can be exercised 
within the context of bargaining and contracting.
4.3  International Buying 
Groups (IBG): Establishment, 
Practices and Implications
Throughout Europe, there is evidence of an increase in 
International Buying Groups (IBGs). These are groups of 
supermarket chains that coordinate procurement across 
borders to obtain the lowest possible prices for well-known 
brands and/or basic private label groceries. IBGs differ in 
size, membership and procedures: in addition, not all the 
top-ten EU retailers were members of an IBG in 2016.93 
More importantly, they differ in terms of legal arrange-
ments and transparency. Some forms of cooperation are 
6  TESCO AND CARREFOUR:  
A STRATEGIC ALLIANCE FOR WHOM?
At the beginning of July 2018, the British press reported 
the news that Tesco and Carrefour, Britain’s biggest gro-
cer and Europe’s largest retailer, had concluded an agree-
ment for a three-year purchasing alliance aimed at buy-
ing own-brand products together, putting more pressure 
on multinational producers like Nestlé and Unilever, and 
offering cheaper products to consumers. As reported in 
The Guardian, the Tesco chief executive and former Uni-
lever executive, Dave Lewis, said: “By working together 
and making the most of our collective product expertise 
and sourcing capability, we will be able to serve our cus-
tomers even better.”94 What is completely missing from 
the picture is the way in which the cut in costs will be ob-
tained and the way in which stronger buying power will 
have ripple effects throughout the chain, all the way to 
farmers and producers. In particular, given the focus on 
Nestlé and Unilever, two multinational companies that 
are leaders in the production of processed food based on 
exotic products like coffee, cocoa and palm oil. As in the 
case of mergers and acquisitions, a narrow focus on eco-
nomic efficiencies and consumer welfare appears inca-
pable of grasping the socio-environmental externalities 
that will be generated. Similarly, a territorial approach 
that only considers the implications in terms of European 
consumers and European actors of the food chain would 
inherently dismiss the extra-European implications of a 
buying agreement between two companies that togeth-
er hold 8% of the western European grocery market. As 
a matter of fact, the deal will not squeeze suppliers (as 
indicated by Reuters)95 but the farmers that are at the or-
igin of the food chain.
bilateral and informal. Others have their own legal and 
commercial identity and are funded through membership 
fees. Few are relatively transparent about their activities, 
others do not even have a website. Overall, arrangements 
tend to be confidential because of the strategic nature of 
the information that parties share and the way in which it 
can affect their buying power. What is clear is that, beside 
the consolidation that is taking place through mergers and 
acquisitions, there is a rise in the conclusion of bilateral or 
multilateral buying agreements that alters the distribution 
of bargaining power across the food chain. The recent case 
of a planned purchasing agreement between Tesco and 
Carrefour, Britain’s biggest grocer and Europe’s largest re-
tailer, is self-evident (Box 6).
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International and national buying alliances have not 
been completely off the radar of national competition 
authorities. On the contrary, they have been investigated 
in France, Italy and Germany. However, the role of IBGs in 
increasing supermarket buying power has not been the 
subject of systematic research or of clear political and le-
gal interventions. As a matter of fact, they are conceived 
by competition authorities as an opportunity to increase 
accessibility by means of reduced price and, at least in the 
absence of unfair trading practices, the way in which buy-
er power may affect farmers and intermediaries upstream 
does not represent a political and economic priority. Sim-
ilarly, the possibility to organise large-scale purchasing 
groups may be seen as a way of scaling up what consumers 
already do in order to obtain lower prices and avoid large-
scale distribution. In the case of Carrefour and Tesco (Box 
6), for example, Ian Wright, the chief executive of Britain’s 
Food and Drink Federation, said the Tesco-Carrefour deal 
would increase concerns about the distribution of buyer 
power already impacted by the Sainsbury-Asda proposed 
merger. For him, the risks of these agreements would be 
imposed on suppliers, mostly smaller firms, and therefore 
it would be “imperative that these important changes to 
retailer/supplier market dynamics are properly examined 
by the competition authorities — in the round.”96 However, 
analysts at Fitch Ratings do not expect the Tesco-Carrefour 
partnership to be subject to competition scrutiny as they 
have hardly any geographic overlap, which would elim-
inate one of the most important factors in the definition 
of ‘relevant market’ for the purposes of anti-competitive 
practices. As in other areas of competition law, a broad or 
narrow interpretation of the aim and objectives of its tech-
nical content would thus make the difference in the assess-
ment and definition of policy responses to these horizontal 
buying agreements.
The reason why it is important to talk about 
European and large-scale international buying 
groups is because of the alteration in power 
dynamics that they generate along the food 
chain and the implications that they may have 
both upstream and downstream. 
Firstly, groups tend to focus on products that cater to uni-
form and widespread consumers and to increase the stand-
ardisation of the market. Secondly, they generally agree on 
common standards and specifications that may require 
investments to be implemented, reducing the number of 
competitors and thereby determining a prejudice for the 
smallest producers. Thirdly, IBGs are often organising on-
line tenders that can be joined only by a selected number 
of providers, mainly those capable of providing sufficient 
quotas at competitive prices. 
With less competition among sellers and buy-
ers and with the need to provide higher vol - 
umes and homogenised demands, internation-
al buying groups may create a situation where 
only large producers have access to market. 
In addition, the risk is all with the producers. Those who 
have the possibility to sell their products through retail 
stores, in fact, have everything to lose if they become in-
capable of adopting the requirements of the buyer or if 
they were to fail in granting the homogeneous product that 
is required by the network of buyers. In addition, the few 
arrangements discussed in a 2017 SOMO report97 seem to 
aim at reducing the purchasing price (even in the context 
of possible socio-environmental standards) by leveraging 
coordination and power: no example is known of interna-
tional buying groups where the mechanism has been used 
to require higher socio-environmental standards without 
being detrimental to small-scale producers, or guarantee 
remunerative prices leading to a living income to farmers or 
to improve the overall ecological and social impact of the 
value chain.
4.4  Sugar Taxes to Protect 
Health: the Legality of State 
Interventions in the Market
Art. 107 of the TFEU inhibits any form of transfer of state 
resources that selectively favours certain undertakings. 
Although there are exceptions with regards to minimum 
threshold, development of regions and depressed areas, 
and guidelines that specifically concern states’ interven-
tions in support of farming, there is the risk that direct 
support to small-scale farmers to the exclusion of large-
scale undertakings; public procurement measures orient-
ed towards local producers; and other forms of public in-
tervention envisaged in the scoreboards, may be deemed 
anti-competitive. One interesting connection between the 
discipline of state aid and the food chain is represented by 
the decision of local or national authorities to proactively 
favour healthy diets or oppose the excessive consumption 
of sugar, fat, salt, etc. This may assume the form of man-
datory labelling, subsidies, prohibition and taxes: each of 
these regulatory interventions may fall within the scope of 
articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU, which has been broadly 
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interpreted by the European Court of Justice so that state 
aid does not only encompass direct contributions to na-
tional undertakings. Whether it is a Member State’s right to 
decide on the objective of different taxes and levies, in or-
der to comply with EU State aid rules, Member States must 
design taxes in a non-discriminatory manner. 
A recent example originates from the decision of the Irish 
government to introduce a sugar tax on sweetened drinks 
containing 5 grams or more of sugar (Box 7). Such an ex-
ample, along with other examples where the Commission 
recognised that state intervention can be directed to sup-
porting the rural economy, facilitate the adoption of more 
sustainable products and production processes (such as 
greener cars or engines), and show that state aid could 
be an important area to be considered when it comes to 
greening food chains and embracing ecological and social 
considerations. As discussed by Julian Nowag, state aid 
discipline and jurisprudence have been addressing the in-
tegration of public interests (environment, health, rural de-
velopment, etc.) since the mid-1990s98 and are less narrow 
in their implementation of balancing and acceptance of 
limits to market fundamentalism than competition law is.99
7  THE IRISH SUGAR TAX AND ITS 
COMPATIBILITY WITH EU STATE AID LAW
In February 2018, Ireland notified the European Com-
mission of its plans with the aim of obtaining legal 
certainty that the measure introducing a sugar tax 
on sweetened drinks containing 5 grams or more of 
sugar (sodas and juices) did not involve any state aid 
within the meaning of EU rules. The Commission in its 
assessment found that soft drinks can be treated dif-
ferently to other sugary products in view of health ob-
jectives. In the formulation of its position, the Com-
mission took into account the fact that soft drinks are 
the main source of calories devoid of any nutritional 
value and thereby raise particular health issues. Fur-
thermore, soft drinks were considered to be particu-
larly liable to lead to overconsumption and represent 
a higher risk of obesity, also when compared to other 
sugary drinks and solid food. On this basis, the Com-
mission concluded that the scope of the Irish sugar 
sweetened drinks tax and its overall design are con-
sistent with the health objectives pursued and does 
not unduly distort competition. 
4.5  Concentration in the Seeds and 
Fertiliser Sector: Unsustainability 
of Mergers Regulation
2018 began with decisions by the European Commission’s 
and United States’ antitrust authorities clearing the acqui-
sition of Monsanto by Bayer AG (Box 8).100 However, the 
acquisition of Monsanto by the German-based multina-
tional enterprise and the ‘disappearance’ of the American 
company represent only one of the multiple large-scale 
consolidations that have been taking place in this sector. 
As a matter of fact, the rise of agribusiness transnational 
enterprises has been favoured and has contributed to the 
consolidation of industrialised input-intensive agriculture, 
of which fertilisers, pesticides and seed manipulation are 
the main outcomes. 
There is no doubt that agriculture, the ecological balance 
of the planet, the preservation of soil and biodiversity, the 
production of, and protection from, climate change and the 
distribution of power along the food chain are intimately 
interlinked. The growing adoption of intensive ‘conven-
tional’ farming methods has been widely recognised as di-
rectly connected with ecological unsustainability. It would 
thus be myopic to think about the impact on price and 
yields of agricultural production without considering the 
consequences for the environment and the way in which 
technological solutions redefine agriculture, and the so-
cio-economic implications of concentrated markets for in-
puts. However, the tendency of competition authorities is 
to avoid such complex understandings of the link between 
inputs, production and the socio-environmental equilibri-
um of the planet, with the result that mega-mergers are the 
norm.101 
Before Bayer and Monsanto, in fact, there was the $130 
billion merger between US agro-chemical giants, Dow and 
DuPont, ChemChina’s acquisition of Syngenta for $43 bil-
lion and the planned merger with Sinochem. Overall, these 
deals alone will place as much as 70% of the agrochemical 
industry in the hands of only three merged companies.102 
In addition, mergers are also affecting the fertiliser market 
and are determined by the companies’ desire to integrate 
their value chains and have direct access to market. This 
is the case, for example, of the Saskatoon-based Potash-
Corp, which was one of the world’s leading suppliers of 
potash and a major producer of other fertilising minerals. 
In January 2018, Potash announced its merger with the Cal-
gary-based Agrium, which was a leader in other commodi-
ties and had an extensive network of retail operations. The 
two united to form Nutrien, a name that may generate trust 
from the consumers but that may not immediately reveal 
the main source of income for the company.103 
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In the case of Bayer-Monsanto (Box 8), IPES-food raised 
both the issue that farmers as intermediate consumers 
would be negatively affected by lower offers and higher 
prices and that the acquisition would produce an unprec-
edented concentration of agricultural data, all in the hands 
of one company. The point was supported with the evi-
dence that Monsanto had perfected the practice of creat-
ing platforms that lock farmers into using specific products 
and that the use of this information could lead to differenc-
es in prices amongst farmers and the reduction of options 
to farmers.107 However, the control of big agricultural data 
can also intensify power asymmetries between farmers 
and large agribusinesses.108 As a matter of fact, “Big Data 
supports and pushes industrialised farming. Most agroe-
cological small farmers have little use for precision farm-
ing or smart farming in their current incarnations, as these 
technologies are mostly tailored to monoculture industrial 
farms.”109 In addition, “[f]armers might or might not own 
the raw data generated from their fields, but they have no 
control over the information products generated from it. 
That information could potentially be used to affect pric-
es, insurance rates, and perhaps even to inform investors 
interested in land grabs in the global North and South.”110 
Whereas mainstream competition law may 
grasp the notion that the reduction of products 
and the increase in prices may affect farmers, 
it is currently ill-equipped to engage with the 
loss of practices and biodiversity that may 
occur.
If we want to talk about the seeds and fertiliser sector from 
a competition law perspective, we thus have to adopt a 
value chain (holistic) approach and realise not only that 
concentration and large-scale mergers are taking place in 
different geographies and across sectors (fertilisers with 
chemicals, fertilisers with retailers, fertilisers with seeds 
and plant genome) but also that they have consequences 
that go beyond price, innovation and availability. To start 
with, we need to assess the fact that the proprietary seed 
industry is increasingly interlinked with the world’s largest 
agrochemical corporations. Syngenta (Switzerland), Bayer 
(Germany), BASF (Germany) and DuPont (USA), Monsanto 
(USA), and Dow (USA), which used to be the ‘Big Six’ and are 
now the ‘Big Four’ currently controlling both 60 % of the 
global seed market and 75% of the global pesticides mar-
ket. However, a holistic application of competition law to 
mergers and acquisition, based on the double bottom line 
of planetary boundaries and social foundations, would not 
rest at a mere description and would certainly not be satis-
fied with an investigation of the possible impacts on prices, 
availability and innovation. 
A doughnut approach to mergers and acquisitions in the 
seed and fertiliser system would question the consequenc-
es in terms of permanence of alternative practices (not only 
competing products), the repercussions on non-conven-
tional agriculture, the impact on non-patented seeds and 
their use, the implications for biodiversity, the modification 
of the incentives to shift towards ecological production or 
conventional agriculture, and the link between concentra-
tion, monoculture, use of fertilisers and the health condi-
tions of both farmworkers and consumers. In addition, it 
would also question if the merger was having positive or 
negative effects on job creation and working conditions 
(in November 2018, Bayer announced its intention to cut 
12,000 jobs)104 and would look at it through the lens of big 
data and agri-tech innovation. As a matter of fact, conven-
tional and mechanised agriculture is increasingly depend-
ent on the access and management of information that is 
obtained from farmers and farmland. As stressed by a re-
cent IPES report on concentration in the food system, “big 
data connects inputs — seeds, fertilisers and chemicals — to 
farm equipment and F&B processers and retailers to con-
sumers in an unprecedented way, and in the process, data 
has become a major driver of consolidation.”105 The market 
for digital-based agricultural services is expected to reach 
US$4.55 billion by 2020.106 
4.6  Horizontal Agreements, Prices 
and Standards in the Food Sector
One of the pillars of the contemporary EU competition law 
framework is the prohibition of horizontal agreements. As 
clearly established by Article 101 of the TFEU, the idea is 
that coordination between competitors is inherently det-
rimental to the consumers, because it goes against the 
notion itself of competition. When it comes to the food 
system, the existence of Article 101 can be particularly 
precious for small-scale farmers and consumers who may 
suffer from cartels and agreements concluded between in-
termediaries, buyers and retailers. Throughout the history 
of competition law, there has been an abundance of cases 
where competitors coordinated practices that increased 
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8  THE BAYER-MONSANTO MERGER111
At the beginning of 2018 both the EU Commission and the 
United States antitrust authority authorised the acquisi-
tion of Monsanto by Bayer. In the case of Europe, the pur-
chase was subordinated to the adoption of some structur-
al conditionalities such as Bayer’s sale to BASF of a ‘Bayer 
Divestment Business’ to address the competition con-
cerns on overlaps between Bayer and Monsanto in seeds, 
pesticides and digital agriculture. This choice has been 
criticised by several lawyers and academics, who have 
stressed that “replacing the process of organic competi-
tion that would have developed between Bayer and Mon-
santo, had the merger not been approved, with an ‘artifi-
cially’ engineered new competitor, put together through 
a competition authority, mandated ‘bricolage’ of various 
assets from the merging parties, without proper analysis 
of how these could fit the existing assets and competitive 
strategies of BASF, seems to be a rather risky and, certainly 
not market-friendly, approach to organise the competitive 
interactions in this industry.”112 Despite the critiques, an 
orthodox approach to competition law suggests that the 
choice of the European Commission appears fully in line 
with a narrow consideration of competition law as primar-
ily based on prices and consumer well-being. In particular, 
it fails to assess the intimate connection between methods 
of production, the environment and the socio-economic 
construction of the food system. On the contrary, the com-
petition Commissioner recognised that: “During its inves-
tigation, the Commission has been petitioned through 
emails, postcards, letters and tweets expressing concerns 
about the proposed acquisition” but that the “Commis-
sion’s mandate under the European merger control rules 
is to assess the merger solely from a competition perspec-
tive. This assessment must be impartial and is subject to 
the scrutiny of the European Courts. Other concerns raised 
by the petitioners relate to European and national rules to 
protect food safety, consumers, the environment and the 
climate. While these concerns are of great importance, 
they cannot form the basis of a merger assessment”.113 
Even in that context, several arguments were advanced 
against the compatibility of the acquisition with the EU 
mergers’ regulation (Regulation 139/2004). As discussed 
in a letter that IPES-food sent to the Commissioner before 
the decision was made,114 an increased concentration in 
the seeds and fertiliser sector (already particularly con-
centrated) may not only be detrimental to farmers (as in-
termediate consumers of the products sold by Bayer and 
Monsanto) but also to final consumers in terms of availa-
bility, innovation and research and development. For ex-
ample, two studies cited in the letter looked at the seed 
industry in different European countries showing that pri-
vate plant breeding has narrowed its focus to fewer spe-
cies and that the diversity within species may also have 
declined. Similarly, research conducted at the University 
of Illinois in 2016 concluded that not a single new species 
has been introduced into the European food system since 
the era of large-scale mergers began. On the contrary, 
numbers show that the dominant companies in this highly 
concentrated sector devote at least 40% of their R&D ex-
penditures to just one crop — maize. Outside of the cate-
gories that are usually considered by competition author-
ities, a push towards a more chemicals-based agriculture 
would also have significant consequences with regards to 
the preservation of biodiversity, the protection of the en-
vironment and the health conditions of both farmworkers 
and consumers. 
Within the context of the EU Treaties, a further argument 
was recently raised that the Bayer merger should have 
been read through the lens of article 42 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, which requires the 
European institutions to subordinate the application of EU 
competition law to the implementation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, in particular to the achievement of the 
goals of stabilising the market, assuring the availability of 
supplies and assuring that supplies reach consumers at a 
reasonable price (Art. 39, see Section 5.7).115 
In addition, Lianos noticed “[a]lthough public 
interest considerations do not explicitly form 
part of the substantive test of EU merger con-
trol, Article 21(4) EUMR includes a legitimate 
interest clause, which provides that  Member 
States may take appropriate measures to pro-
tect three specified legitimate interests:  
public security, plurality of the media and 
prudential rules, and other unspecified public 
interests that are recognised by the Commis-
sion after notification by the Member State.”116 
If a Member State wishes to claim an additional legitimate 
interest, such as the protection of small-scale farming 
as a structural element of the national economy, →
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employment, biodiversity, the right to food or so-
cio-environmental sustainability of the food chain, it shall 
communicate this to the Commission, which must decide 
within 25 working days whether the additional interest is 
a) compatible with EU law; and b) qualifies as a legitimate 
interest under article 21(4). This opportunity, so far not ex-
plored, should thus be taken seriously by Member States, 
civil society organisations and political actors.
Shifting geography, it is noteworthy that the merger has 
also been cleared by the Competition Commission of 
South Africa, which specifically focused on the cotton 
market and the fact that “over 90% of seed used in South 
Africa’s cotton production uses GM seeds”. As a conse-
quence, they imposed a condition for the merger that the 
merged entity would have to “divest and sell the entire 
global Liberty Link trait technology and the associated 
Liberty branded agro-chemicals business of Bayer”. Given 
the mandatory analysis of the impact on public interest, 
the Commission took into consideration the effects on 
employment and concluded that the merged entity could 
fire 20 workers, but must create at least another 20 jobs 
over 3 years to maintain existing employment levels.
According to Mariam Mayet, Director of the African Center 
for Biodiversity (ACB), “the CCSA’s condition for the dis-
posal of Bayer’s GM cotton assets and its sale to another 
entity that will produce the seed and chemicals commer-
cially in South Africa is still locked into the dominant tech-
nological paradigm. It does not go further than attempting 
to ensure competition in the production and distribution 
of GM technologies. No other farming alternatives are 
considered. The key drivers remain the same: increasing 
economies of scale, uniformity and standardisation in the 
food system. Small farmers face higher input prices, fewer 
choices in seed or crop protection, and lower output pric-
es. Consumers are offered products that are small varia-
tions of standardised processed industrial foods built on 
cheap carbohydrates.”117
A final point to notice is that, as opposed to the Dow/Du 
Pont merger, in the case of Bayer and Monsanto there is 
little (if any) evidence that the Commission carried out a 
thorough analysis of the financial ownership of the two 
companies and the possibility of reduced competition and 
effects on innovation due to common ownership. In the 
case of Dow/Du Pont, “the Commission took this into ac-
count as an element of context in the appreciation of any 
significant impediment to effective competition, noting 
that in the context of innovation competition, such find-
ings provide indications that innovation competition in 
crop protection should be less intense as compared with 
an industry with no common shareholding.”118 If we also 
consider that the main shareholders in BASF are the same 
of both Bayer and Monsanto, the need for a structural re-
form of the European Union Merger Regulation appears 
inevitable and urgently needed. It will have to require, at 
least, full disclosure and an in-depth scrutiny of financial 
ties between merging companies, and introduce a refined 
concept of de jure and de facto control so as to grasp the 
current trends in financial investments;119 and shift on to 
the undertakings the responsibility to prove that common 
ownership would not have negative effects in terms of 
competitiveness, research, development and socio-envi-
ronmental impacts of production.
prices, limited availability or negatively affected the quality 
of production. In most cases, the aim is to be able to extract 
value that would otherwise not be available in case of com-
petitive practices. This may also happen along the chain, 
with undertakings operating at different levels colluding to 
fix prices that are then imposed down the chain. One of the 
most recent European cases of this kind in the food sector 
concerns Böhmer and Kuhn, which were found guilty of 
collaborating to fix prices for potatoes and onions in their 
contracts with retail group Metro (Box 9). 
Thus, Article 101 has been historically used  
by European companies to reject any possibility 
of adopting a common purchasing price for 
goods. 
As some of the people interviewed for this report stated, 
the fear of being sanctioned, led companies and associa-
tions to establish clear protocols of conduct during meet-
ings among competitors and that they interrupted conver-
sations that concerned the adoption of a common price for 
farmers capable of guaranteeing them decent living condi-
tions. Similarly, the adoption of binding sustainability sec-
torial standards of production is often opposed by compa-
nies due to the risk of a legal infringement. 
In its interpretation and application, Article 101 has often 
been considered with rigidity by competition authorities 
and courts: especially if competitors converge around prices. 
→
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9  VERTICAL AGREEMENTS IN THE EU POTATO AND ONION MARKET
The concept of vertical agreements covers the purchase or 
supply of intermediate goods (e.g. raw materials or goods 
subjected to further processing by the buyer); finished 
goods (e.g. for resale by a retailer) or services. Vertical 
agreements may be structured in different ways and have 
very diverse substantive effects on competition. Article 
101(1) applies to vertical agreements and similarly to hori-
zontal agreements, although vertical restraints tend to be 
considered less harmful than horizontal restraints. After 
a procedure that lasted almost five years, on May 2018, 
the German authority sanctioned Hans-Willi Böhmer Ver-
packung and Vertrieb GmbH & Co. KG and Kartoffel-Kuhn 
GmbH for a total of €13.2m. The two enterprises are not 
direct competitors but operate at different levels of potato 
and onion packaging (Böhmer) and supply packed pota-
toes and onions to the Metro group. According to the Pres-
ident of the German competition authority, the two firms 
had “agreed on an important parameter in the calculation 
of their weekly offers to Metro. By aligning their purchase 
prices used in the calculation, the two major suppliers of 
the Metro group virtually eliminated any price competition 
between them”.120 This case contains the classic elements 
of anti-competitive agreements, which force a higher price 
on buyers without any other justification than extra-profit 
and has a negative impact on competition. As we discuss 
in this report, this case must be kept separate and distinct 
from the introduction of standards and coordinated prac-
tices that increase the environmental and social sustaina-
bility of production.
It is important to stress that vertical integration is raising 
less concern and a lower level of scrutiny than horizontal 
mergers. This is particularly true in the case of common 
ownership by the same financial actors who operate as 
shareholders in different undertakings along the same 
value chain. However, the commonality of interest at dif-
ferent steps of the chain (for example between suppliers 
and retailers) should immediately raise concerns in terms 
of the possibility of coordinating prices and squeezing val-
ue away from any other level of the chain (producers, con-
sumers and other intermediaries). A reform of the Merger 
Regulation should thus specifically address the issue of 
vertical integration through common ownership and in-
troduce ad hoc procedural and substantive rules.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the European Commission 
and some national authorities have introduced vertical 
agreement block exemption rules with regards to specif-
ic agreements that take place along the value chain and 
which satisfy specific requirements, for example that the 
market share of each of the parties to the agreement must 
not exceed 30% and that there are no hardcore restrictions 
in the agreement. The vertical exemption block is based 
on the idea of ‘safe harbours’ that should provide business 
and legal certainty to undertakings. Price fixing is always 
excluded from the exemption because it is considered a 
hardcore restriction.121 Another form of avoiding the in-
tervention of the EU competition authority in the case of 
vertical agreements, is the submission of a De Minimis 
notice, which will be accepted by the EC when the parties 
have a combined market share of less than 15% if the un-
dertakings are not competitors (10 % in cases where they 
are competing) or the agreement is concluded between 
small and medium-sized enterprises with fewer than 250 
employees or an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million 
Euro.
Because of this, the content of Article 101 has  
increasingly been considered by some law-
yers, companies and civil society organisations  
as an obstacle to the adoption of higher en- 
vironmental and social standards by market 
actors than those required by national and 
international authorities. 
Courts and market actors have thus attempted to act 
against the rigidity of the prohibition by expanding the 
possibility of exceptions to its application. Section 5 below 
engages with some of the proposals that may legally justify 
horizontal coordination between competitors, and offers 
some critical considerations of the possible limits of such 
change in the interpretation of Article 101.
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5   The Unsustainability of 
Competition Law: Problems, 
Challenges and Solutions
Price and consumer-centred competition, that is driven by 
the idea of market efficiency, tends to ignore all the oth-
er public policy concerns that may arise in the case of a 
horizontal agreement, or a merger or a power differential 
between actors along the food chain. In particular, pure 
environmental and social issues lose significance before 
antitrust authorities because they are not actually part of 
the efficiency equation that is applied, unless they can be 
presented in narrow economic terms based on a cost-ben-
efit analysis. The only way in which these kinds of benefits 
and negative externalities, generated by an anti-compet-
itive practice can be considered, is if they are translated 
into the vocabulary of the consumers’ economic welfare. 
Only when the reduction of biodiversity or the adoption 
of a living price for farmers are read through the lens of 
price, availability and innovation, can they be compared 
with the positive or negative impacts that the anti-compet-
itive practice is deemed to produce. As clearly exemplified 
by the Guidelines of the Commission on Article 101(3), an 
agreement between undertakings is pro-competitive and 
compatible with the objectives of the Community compe-
tition rules only “[w]hen the pro-competitive effects of an 
agreement outweigh its anti-competitive effects.”122 
Although not totally impossible, the traditional way for 
integrating environmental and social sustainability con-
siderations in competition law requires their redefinition 
into data and figures that competition law can process 
and compare. It is important to think of possible leverages 
that could be used to favour (or mandate) the integration 
of public concerns and, in other cases, to remove the issue 
from the area of competition and competition law, so that 
other institutions deal with it. 
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Within the context of an economic system 
that is increasingly exploiting both people and 
the planet, it is important to go beyond trans- 
lation/integration and imagine a new system 
of competition law that is disengaged from 
consumer centrism and fully embedded in the 
double limit of planetary boundaries and of 
social foundations as external to competition 
law. 
As exemplified by figure 1 above, the idea is to abandon the 
neoliberal understanding of competition as a neutral and 
inevitable mechanism based on price and think of rules of 
competition that fit within the idea of doughnut economics 
proposed by Kate Raworth.123 In order to achieve this, the 
ideology, institutions and people that make competition 
law possible should be organised and act in a way that is: 
a) informed by a sophisticated understanding of the real 
value of goods and services that takes into consideration 
socio-environmental externalities and is not only defined 
by the price tag; b) compatible with the need to respect the 
planet and to improve the conditions of every person on 
this planet. 
In this section we identify some instances in which the Eu-
ropean legal framework already considers public interest 
concerns and we make some suggestions of what could be 
done to go even further. In particular, this section focuses 
on the public interest concerns and other non-econom-
ic concerns, such as environmental sustainability, social 
sustainability, the right to food, and fairness, that should 
be considered — to some extent — by competition laws, ac-
cording to EU law. 
5.1  Public Interest Considerations
There is no specific definition of ‘public interest’ in EU law, 
but this is a concept that often finds application by the 
courts.124 Public interest has been described as having a 
three-dimensional form whereby it “reflects a constitu-
tional reality that often places judicial review at the inter-
section of national, supranational and international legal 
norms.”125 Thus, public interest is a dynamic concept that 
changes over time with the adaptation of public values, 
morals, and laws of a society.126 Public interest concerns 
generally find application in courts either vertically or hori-
zontally. The former implies that the application of a ‘low-
er law’ would bring about the violation of the constitution 
or any other ‘higher law’ encapsulating the public interest 
concern127. The horizontal application of public interest is 
instead a matter of balancing between two or more public 
interest concerns, which in theory have the same status in 
the hierarchy of the sources of law. It might be possible to 
delineate three different types of conflicts between public 
interest concerns:
a competition among different subjects in the enjoyment 
of the same right (as, for example, in the case in which 
it is not possible to guarantee a certain social benefit to 
all those who have the right).
b competition of non-homogeneous individual interests 
(such as, for example, freedom of expression and pro-
tection of privacy).
c competition between individual interests and other in-
terests (as, for example, in the case of the conflict be-
tween the right to news and state secrets).
As a matter of fact, competition authorities 
have considered public interest concerns in the 
enforcement of their prerogative powers.128 
Consumer welfare is certainly one of the guiding principles 
for the EU Authorities, but it is not the only one.129 By law 
and by facts, for instance, the ‘internal market’ objective 
has always played a central role in the enforcement of EU 
laws, including competition law. In the Glaxo saga, the ECJ 
had to establish whether the prohibition of parallel trade 
alone was enough to justify the infringement of compe-
tition laws, or whether it was necessary to also find a re-
duction in the welfare of the final consumer. The ECJ held 
that the prevention of parallel imports was unlawful, as it 
divided the internal market. In the context of an economic 
system that is increasingly affecting people and the planet, 
authorities and judges are increasingly asked to weigh pub-
lic interest in enforcing competition law130.
A possibility of introducing public policy considerations as 
an external limit to competition is offered by Article 101(3). 
In one important reading of the Article, the EC used para-
graph 3 to balance other policy objectives, such as invest-
ment, regional development, social agenda or transporta-
tion.131 For instance, in the Ford-Volkswagen case132 the EC 
observed: “In the assessment of this case, the Commission 
also takes note of the fact that the project constitutes the 
largest ever single foreign investment in Portugal. It is es-
timated to lead, inter alia, to the creation of about 5,000 
jobs and indirectly create up to another 10,000 jobs, as well 
as attracting other investments in the supply industry. It 
therefore contributes to the promotion of the harmonious 
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10  PUBLIC INTEREST CONCERNS ARE ALREADY PART OF THE EU FRAMEWORK
Statements are sometime made that public interest con-
cerns have no role in competition law. However, the op-
posite is true: a number of examples demonstrate that the 
EU framework states the opposite and that enforcement 
practices have also followed from these concerns.
Article 3(3) TFEU: introducing the concept of “a highly 
competitive social market economy.”
Article 9 TFEU: states that “(i)n defining and implement-
ing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into ac-
count requirements linked to the promotion of a high level 
of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protec-
tion, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of 
education, training and protection of human health”.
Article 11 TFEU: “Environmental protection requirements 
must be integrated into the definition and implementation 
of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a 
view to promoting sustainable development.”
Article 12 TFEU: consumer protection stating that: “con-
sumer protection requirements shall be taken into ac-
count in defining and implementing other Union policies 
and activities”.
Article 168 TFEU: considers human health and states that 
“A high level of human health protection shall be ensured 
in the definition and implementation of all Union policies 
and activities”.
Article 175 TFEU: refers to the objectives of economic, 
social and territorial cohesion set out by Article 174 and 
affirms that: “Member States shall conduct their econom-
ic policies and shall coordinate them in such a way as, in 
addition, to attain the objectives set out in Article 174. The 
formulation and implementation of the Union’s policies 
and actions and the implementation of the internal mar-
ket shall take into account the objectives set out in Article 
174 and shall contribute to their achievement.”
Article 208(1): introduces the idea of policy coherence for 
development and affirms that the objectives of develop-
ment cooperation shall be taken into account in the poli-
cies which are likely to affect developing countries.
In addition, the Commission’s Guidelines on the applica-
tion of article 101(3) [2004] OJ C 101/7 at para. 43 state that 
“The assessment under Article [101] (3) of benefits flowing 
from restrictive agreements is in principle made within the 
confines of each relevant market to which the agreement 
relates. The Community competition rules have as their 
objective the protection of competition on the market 
and cannot be detached from this objective. Moreover, the 
condition that consumers must receive a fair share of the 
benefits implies in general that efficiencies generated by 
the restrictive agreement within a relevant market must 
be sufficient to outweigh the anti-competitive effects 
produced by the agreement within that same relevant 
market. Negative effects on consumers in one geographic 
market or product market cannot normally be balanced 
against and compensated by positive effects for consum-
ers in another unrelated geographic market or product 
market. However, where two markets are related, efficien-
cies achieved on separate markets can be taken into ac-
count provided that the group of consumers affected by 
the restriction and benefiting from the efficiency gains are 
substantially the same”. 
development of the Community and the reduction of re-
gional disparities which is one of the basic aims of the Trea-
ty”133. The EC therefore exempted the agreement, under 
Article 101(3), thanks to its “extremely positive effects on 
the infrastructure ad employment in one of the poorest re-
gions in the Community.”134
However, the EC approach to art. 101(3) gener-
ates several shortcomings from the perspective 
of recognising and respecting the socio- envi-
ronmental needs of a truly sustainable world. 
Firstly, everything must be monetised in order to be visible 
to the competition authorities. Trees, human rights, labour 
conditions, etc., have to be translated into data and figures, 
a process that it is inherently limited and reductionist. Sec-
ondly, a consumer-based vision of socio-environmental 
considerations only considers consumers’ benefit, and in 
particular the benefit that is experienced by those consum-
ers who are directly or indirectly affected by the agreement 
or anti-competitive practice. According to para 85 of the EC 
guidelines on Article 81 (now Article 101), “The concept of 
‘fair share’ implies that the pass-on of benefits must at least 
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compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative 
impact caused to them by the restriction of competition 
found under Article 81(1)”. Additionally, Article 101 (3) TFEU 
refers only to efficiencies created within the specific mar-
ket, in the EU, where the anticompetitive distortion takes 
place. Hence, improvements in connected markets, per-
haps even outside the EU, would not count for the purpose 
of Article 101(3). 
5.2  Integrating Socio-Environmental 
Sustainability but Beyond Monetary 
Representations of Society and Nature 
At the end of 2018, the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) reminded us of the necessity to change pro-
duction methods if we want to keep the increase in global 
temperature below 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels. 
This is closely related to the food system both as a large 
contributor to greenhouse gases and as one of the most 
vulnerable sectors. Moving in this direction, the 2015 Paris 
agreement, adopted by consensus by 196 Countries on 12 
December 2015, aims at low greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate-resilient development. The Paris agreement is the 
last of many national and international legal instruments 
adopted to reach this objective. Yet, the recent history of the 
EU agricultural system has gone in the opposite direction, 
fanning flames on the fire of specialisation, industrialisa-
tion and financialised agriculture and food production.135 
Coupled with the already observed increasing levels of 
concentration, the industry has embraced a production 
model which is mainly export oriented. According to many 
experts and empirical studies, including the Food and Agri-
culture Organization136 and the Union of Concerned Scien-
tists,137 this way of producing food is largely unsustainable 
for the environment and responsible for hidden costs that 
are experienced daily by people on the ground.
In this context, competition law can play a role in support-
ing a U-turn of the EU food and agricultural system. Of 
course, if coupled with other legal and non-legal interven-
tions. In our opinion, for example, the scope and vocabu-
lary of the Maastricht Treaty (and the Lisbon Treaty after-
wards) have opened interesting cracks in a technocratic 
area of law otherwise ruled by the principles of perfect 
competition, equilibrium, marginal utility and consumer 
well-being. The introduction of Article 11 of the Treaty on 
11  THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 11 TFEU138
When it comes to the relationship between the single 
market and non-financial interests, one of the most in-
teresting elements of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) is represented by Article 
11.139 Whereas the substance and application of the ar-
ticle are discussed below, it is important to mention its 
historical evolution from the origin of the European Eco-
nomic Community to Lisbon. In the absence of a spe-
cific provision, as long ago as 1973, Member States and 
the Council of the European Communities had already 
recognised that the fight against pollution could justify 
a reduction in the freedom of movement of goods and 
coordinated action. A few years later, in 1985, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice recognised that the protection of 
the environment represented “one of the community’s 
essential objectives”. In 1986 the Single European Act 
was signed as the basis of the European Community, and 
Article 130r (2) was introduced to require that ‘environ-
mental protection requirements shall be a component 
of the Union’s other policies’. It was the beginning of the 
dialogue (someone would say integration) between free 
market, competition and environmental considerations. 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 reinforced such provisions 
by replacing “shall be a component” with “must be inte-
grated”, therefore adopting a version with stronger legal 
teeth.140 The Amsterdam Treaty that amended Maas-
tricht in 1997 made it even more relevant by explicitly 
making the provision applicable in all areas of EU law and 
of EC action (including policy-making, regulations, direc-
tives and decisions) and by introducing the linkage be-
tween environmental protection and sustainable devel-
opment.141 The Lisbon Treaty did not alter the formula, 
which in principle requires EU institutions and Member 
States to take the environmental impact of any measure 
into account. As discussed below, the principle and ideas 
behind EU competition law are such that the integration 
of environmental and sustainable concerns within the 
context of competition law significantly differs from the 
way in which similar considerations are introduced in the 
consideration of free movement and state aid. One of the 
aims of this report is to highlight this discrepancy and 
provide food for alternative thoughts.
5   The Unsustainability of Competition Law
37 
in Section 3 above invite considerations that go beyond EU 
orthodoxy and offer legal and political opportunities that 
may have not been evident before. They nudge policy-mak-
ers, lawyers, academics, civil society and the private sector 
to question the premises and function of competition law 
within the context of the contemporary European Union. 
They are an invitation to look at the roots of the current le-
gal and ideological framework, its mechanisms, outcomes 
and holistic shortcomings.
5.3  The Exception for 
Public Undertakings
A second example of the possibility for states and compe-
tition authorities to consider and integrate public interests 
that differ from the achievement of a perfectly efficient 
market is offered by Article 106 of the TFEU (ex Article 86 
EC) on public undertakings, according to which:
1 In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to 
which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, 
Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force 
any measure contrary to the rules contained in the 
Treaties, in particular to those rules provided for in Arti-
cle 18 and Articles 101 to 109.
2 Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services 
of general economic interest or having the character of 
a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the 
rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules 
on competition, in so far as the application of such 
rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in 
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The de-
velopment of trade must not be affected to such an ex-
tent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.
While this provision seems to be of clear application, it has 
been demonstrated that it is often difficult to discern be-
tween undertakings “entrusted with operation of services 
of general economic interest” and undertakings perform-
ing tasks for public authorities.
12  CASE C-343/95 DIEGO CALI & 
FIGLI V SERVIZI ECOLOGICI PORTI 
DO GENOVA [1997] ECR I-1547
Calì operated transportation services, for third parties, 
for petrochemical products at sea in tankers and it used 
the oil port of Genoa-Multedo for the purpose of loading 
and unloading products, including acetone. For the oper-
ations in the Genoa port, Calì used a subcontractor Porto 
Petroli di Genova SpA (‘SEPG’). The contract involved the 
loading and unloading of the products against the pay-
ment of a fee. However, by the end of the contract period, 
SEPG also invoiced Calì for the antipollution surveillance 
services performed on Calì’s behalf. The latter refused to 
pay on the grounds that it had never requested, nor had 
recourse, to services of that type during the operations 
carried out in the oil port of Genoa. Calì claimed that this 
was an abuse of dominant position on the side of SEPG. 
The ECJ recognised that “[t]he anti-pollution surveil-
lance for which SEPG was responsible in the oil port of 
Genoa is a task in the public interest which forms part of 
the essential functions of the state as regards protection 
of the environment in maritime areas”142. However, it 
also observed that SEPG was entrusted with the exercise 
of a public service by the public authority, against the 
payment of fees approved by public authorities, thus Ar-
ticle 102 (article 86) could not find application143.
The Treaties fail to give guidance on the implementation 
of these policies, but the letter of the law is clear on the 
results to achieve, which is the integration and implemen-
tation of environmental protection in all the other sectors 
of EU’s policies. Competition law should not be an excep-
tion. The elements contained in the treaties and discussed 
the Functioning of the EU and its subsequent transforma-
tion (Box 11) represent the legislative recognition of the 
need to consider the social function of the market, the in-
tegration of environmental protection, the goal of sustain-
ability and the notion of policy coherence for development. 
The EU Treaties assign to environmental protection a posi-
tion of prominence, Article 11 TFEU establishing that “[e]
nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated 
into the definition and implementation of the Union’s poli-
cies and activities.”144 
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THE PITFALLS OF A RESTRICTIVE 
INTERPRETATION OF COMPETITION LAW
adopting the 1993 Regulation, and that the same Regula-
tion was indeed restricting competition in the provision of 
legal services. However, the Court also observed that: “[a] 
regulation such as the 1993 Regulation could therefore rea-
sonably be considered to be necessary in order to ensure 
the proper practice of the legal profession, as it is organised 
in the Member State concerned.”149 The ECJ has, in other 
words, balanced the public policy concerns encapsulated 
by the 1993 Regulation against the application of competi-
tion laws, ultimately deciding in favour of the former.
In another case, Meca-Medina,150 the ECJ established that, 
although the decision taken by the International Olympic 
Committee was anticompetitive in nature, in the ‘overall 
context’ the objective that the decision intended to achieve 
deserved to prevail over the application of competition 
laws. In the words of the Court, in the “overall context in 
which the rules at issue were adopted, the Commission 
could rightly take the view that the general objective of 
the rules was, as none of the parties disputes, to combat 
doping in order for competitive sport to be conducted fairly 
and that it included the need to safeguard equal chances 
for athletes, athletes’ health, the integrity and objectivity of 
competitive sport and ethical values in sport.”151 
The European Commission has been reluctant to gauge the 
efficiencies created outside of the relevant market145 and 
has in more than one occasion excluded the premise that 
competition might be balanced with other public interest 
concerns146. Some national authorities have instead been 
more open in considering other public policy interests, al-
though rarely concluding that any balancing was possible. 
The ECJ has been generally more open to considering the 
application of other public interest concerns147, sometimes 
including effects taking place outside of the relevant mar-
ket.148 In the landmark Wouters case, the ECJ pointed out 
that, public interest concerns may become an exception to 
the enforcement of EU competition laws. 
In this case, the Bar of the Netherlands tried to regulate the 
legal profession by passing an internal regulation prohibit-
ing partnerships between Bar members and accountants, 
based on overriding reasons of public interest. Mr Wouters, 
a member of the Amsterdam Bar, claimed that this Regula-
tion was anticompetitive, since it had the object or effect 
of restricting competition among service providers in the 
common market. The ECJ concluded that, despite being 
a public professional body, the Bar of the Netherlands 
was subject to the application of competition laws when 
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5.4  Art. 101 and Standard 
Setting — Quality, Price and the 
Excuse of Competition Law
As we discussed in Section 4.6, Article 101 of the TFEU has 
been interpreted by courts and national authorities in such 
a way that when competitors adopt a common standard of 
production or a process, they end up on the radar of com-
petition authorities. Anecdotes from throughout the food 
sector report that firms in a number of other industry sec-
tors have complained about the impossibility of reaching 
industry-wide agreements for the betterment of the envi-
ronment or other social concerns. The banana sector has 
been at the forefront of this discussion, with the World Ba-
nana Forum establishing a working group aimed at taking 
into consideration the cost of producing sustainably and 
what measures could be undertaken collectively by the 
stakeholders throughout the chain to guarantee remunera-
tive prices leading to a living income to farmers who are at 
the origin of the whole production.
The consequences of integrating public inter-
est concerns within the framework of com- 
petition law is undoubtedly significant. 
First of all, it forces competition authorities and courts to 
recognise that competition does not operate in a vacuum 
and that the market is not separated from other elements 
of society, in particular people and the planet. Secondly, it 
breaks with the binomial individual-market that is repre-
sented by the dominant theory of consumer welfare. Final-
ly, it contributes to the change in paradigm: the construc-
tion of a competitive market would cease being the main 
force that determines and affects other values and utilities 
(like equality, environmental protection, animal welfare, 
etc): competition would only be one of the tools that facil-
itate the coexistence and thriving of these interests. As ex-
emplified by the two figures below, the relocation of com-
petition law would not mean the end of competitiveness, 
but the rebalancing of priorities and finalities. Public au-
thority exercised by means of the legislative, executive and 
judiciary can achieve this goal: however, political will and a 
change in the vision of economics are required.
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Lately, a group of NGOs interrogated the major world choc-
olate producers about the difficult situation in which many 
farmers are left and the environmental impact of their way 
of sourcing cocoa.152 Aware of this, many cocoa buyers and 
processors are said to be amenable to agreeing on higher 
supply prices, but also admitted being extremely wary of 
falling foul of competition laws and therefore could not see 
any way to proceed with formal or informal talks. The in-
dustry indeed laments that the boundaries of Article 101 
are unclear and do not seem to support a reading that fa-
vours dialogue among competitors, even when such effi-
ciencies might be created. Whereas, to a certain extent, the 
2010 horizontal guidelines153 provide some indications, 
more clarity on the quality and breath of sustainable col-
laborations would encourage positive behaviours in the 
market. However, as solutions for a living income, the au-
thors would propose also exploring unilateral increases in 
contributions; a more attentive approach to violations of 
socio-economic rights (also to the establishment of indus-
try standards), and the possibility to sanction unfair com-
petitive advantage that derives from placing on the market 
products obtained in violation of international and nation-
al laws.
The current EU legal framework offers some opportunities 
to make the case that agreements on a common living in-
come price for farmers could pass the guillotine of national 
and EU competition authorities. The 2010 horizontal guide-
lines,154 for example, expressly mention non-economic and 
environmental concerns in the application of Article 101 
(3), although they adopt a relatively narrow approach to 
the gauging of such non-economic effects. Another attempt 
to elude the rigid prohibition of horizontal agreements has 
been proposed by the Dutch Authority for Consumers and 
Markets, which in 2014 released a Vision Document on the 
issue of ‘Competition and Sustainability’ where it engages 
with the possibility of justifying cases of horizontal coor-
dination aimed at improving the (environmental and so-
cial) sustainability of the supply chain. This expanded use 
of Art.101 and the integration of public interest concerns 
through agreed process-based measures (PPMs) were test-
ed in the so-called case of the ‘Chicken of Tomorrow’. Re-
tailers agreed to only display chickens on their shelves that 
had been produced respecting a common minimum stand-
ard of chicken welfare and stop selling chickens that were 
raised in worse conditions (Box 13). Although the Dutch 
Authority for Consumers and Markets recognised that the 
agreement could have been approved if deemed compati-
ble with consumers’ willingness to pay more, it would not 
13  THE CHICKEN OF (WHICH?) TOMORROW 
In 2013, Dutch poultry producers began the negotiation 
of an agreement — the Kip van Morgen (‘Chicken of To-
morrow’) — aiming to make poultry production and con-
sumption more sustainable. The agreement intended to 
regulate the following:
 → re-normalising growth rates to decrease health is-
sues and antibiotic usage 
 → reduction of the concentration of chicken in facilities 
(less chickens per m2) 
 → adoption of different measures to decrease injuries 
 → use of sustainable soy in feed 
 → environmental requirements such as lowering car-
bon footprint, sustainable energy use and decreasing 
emissions.
The agreement was submitted to the Dutch Authority for 
Consumers and Markets, although without in-depth and 
sophisticated research capable of demonstrating that 
the increase in price was justified by the improvement in 
the chickens’ conditions or that consumers were willing 
to pay the higher amount. In its decision, the competition 
authority determined the potential anticompetitiveness 
of the common standards and concluded that the effi-
ciencies created by this agreement would not be reflect-
ed at consumer level, and therefore would not outweigh 
the inefficiencies, thus failing to fulfil the conditions for 
the application of Article 101 (3) TFEU. 
allow the convergence between competitors as it would be 
contrary to Article 101 and this proved to be the end of the 
‘Chicken of Tomorrow’ experiment.
The decision of the Dutch Authority for Consumers and 
Markets in the ‘Chicken of Tomorrow’ case does not repre-
sent the natural and inevitable outcome. On the contrary, 
suggestions have been made that “the case would have 
been decided very differently had the parties framed the 
agreement as a standardisation agreement in line with 
the Horizontal Guidance in Art. 101, as the conditions for 
exemption seemed to comply with this.” In the Guidelines, 
the EC lays down an overarching principle on the process of 
the creation of a standard: 
“Where participation in standard-setting is unrestricted 
and the procedure for adopting the standard in ques-
tion is transparent, standardisation agreements which 
contain no obligation to comply with the standard and 
provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory terms will normally not restrict com-
petition within the meaning of Article 101(1)”155
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Moreover, it is accepted in literature and jurisprudence that 
labels that make reference to processes and signal specific 
attributes to consumers (including the payment of remu-
nerative prices leading to a living income for farmers, or the 
fact that tuna has been obtained without killing dolphins) 
may not be restrictive of competition at all. 
As Laurens Ankersmit points out: “As long as such an agree-
ment does not require producers to only sell products ad-
hering to the underlying production standard, but is of a 
voluntary nature, it is unlikely that the agreement will be 
considered to restrict competition.”156 Certainly, since 
there is little precedent in the case law, undertakings par-
taking to such agreements have to face high uncertainty as 
for their legality. The current rigidity in the reading of arti-
cle 101 and the fact that companies (and their counsellors) 
reproduce this fear may discourage the conclusion of po-
tentially useful agreements benefiting environmental and 
social standards. From this perspective, more guidance 
from the EC would definitely help undertakings that have 
serious intentions when entering into these agreements, 
at the same time as discouraging those who mean to use 
them as mere excuses to distort competition to their ad-
vantage. 
In other words, the standard setting process should be:
a Unrestricted: in the sense of giving access to all com-
petitors in the markets affected by the standard.
b Transparent: especially in the case of the creation of a 
standard setting organisation, the governance proce-
dures of this organisation should be clear to all stake-
holders.
c Fair access: access to the standard on fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND).
Obviously, following this procedure does not ensure that 
the substance of the agreement is pro-competitive. Simi-
larly, the lack of an obligation to comply significantly weak-
ens the potential of any agreement. 
However, the EC observes that when environ-
mental and social standards bring about an 
improvement in the quality and innovation of  
the product, reducing at the same time oper- 
ative costs, they may well outweigh the ineffi- 
ciencies created by the standardisation agree-
ment. 
CAN WE MONETISE  
EVERYTHING?
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14  STANDARDS AS LIMITS TO 
COMPETITION — THE CASE OF THE BEEF 
INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY 
In 1998 a report concluded that the Irish beef processing 
industry was in a dire state because of low demand and 
overcapacity. In response to the consultancy, the 10 big-
gest meat processors in Ireland launched the Beef Indus-
try Development Society (BIDS) with the aim to address 
the main concerns and collectively contribute to the fi-
nancial improvement of the sector. According to the rules 
of the Society, plants processing up to 25 per cent of all 
cattle per year would leave the industry by agreement. 
The rules of the Society involved an overall capacity re-
duction by a voluntary abandonment of the industry by 
small players, the imposition of a levy on the processors 
who were going to remain in business, compensation for 
those who had left and restrictive covenants on those 
who decided to leave the Society (such as an agreement 
not to compete in the beef and veal processing market 
in Ireland for a period of two years). The Irish High Court 
focused on the fact that undertakings were implement-
ing the McKinsey report and on the lack of any obligation 
for the remaining players to reduce outputs. According to 
the Court, “[…] there is no injunction on those who might 
remain in the industry to reduce output or indeed even to 
freeze it at a certain level. […] Such players and each one 
of them, would be entirely free to increase production 
within their plants if they so wished. Unless therefore, a 
reduction per se in capacity must necessarily be equated 
with a limitation on output, which in my view is unlikely, 
[…] then I cannot see how the arrangement is objection-
able in this regard; which is of course the major suggest-
ed violation by object restriction”.159 However, the case 
was picked up by the Advocate General who reached the 
opposite conclusion and dismissed the relevance of the 
critical state of the industry then confirmed by the ECJ. 
More importantly, both the Advocate General and the 
Court reached the conclusion that “the fact that their 
sector is experiencing a cyclical or structural crisis does 
not mean […] that Article 81(1) does not apply”.160
This is different in the case of the restriction to competition 
by object. In this scenario, where the agreement is objec-
tively affecting the participation to market by forcing spe-
cific behaviours, the attitude of the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice has been particularly 
strict. The term of reference is represented by para 273 of 
the Horizontal Guidelines stating that: 
“Agreements that use a standard as part of a broader 
restrictive agreement aimed at excluding actual or po-
tential competitors restrict competition by object. For 
instance, an agreement whereby a national association 
of manufacturers sets a standard and puts pressure on 
third parties not to market products that do not comply 
with the standard or where the producers of the incum-
bent product collude to exclude new technology from an 
already existing standard (3) would fall into this cate-
gory.”157 
According to the current discipline, standardi-
sation and horizontal agreements that are not 
directly aimed at restricting competition, but 
have such an impact, could thus be sanctioned 
by the competition authority because of their 
objective effect despite the parties’ intention. 
This is exemplified by a case concerning the Irish beef in-
dustry (BIDS case, see Box 14), where the European Court 
of Justice contradicted the Irish High Court and concluded 
that “an object restriction can be found even if the agree-
ment does not have the restriction of competition as its 
sole aim but also pursues other legitimate objectives”.
While a standard setting agreement may generate improve-
ments outside the EU, competition law will require the 
production of efficiencies (most likely at consumer level) 
within the EU. As one of the interviewees pointed out “[i]
mprovement taking place outside the EU — such as social 
improvements experienced by Fairtrade producers in de-
veloping countries — must at least bear a connection with 
national consumers and their possibility to enjoy some in-
direct benefit. For example, clearly and objectively defined 
Fair Trade standards (or other ‘responsible value chain’ 
standards) may improve downstream competition and in-
crease efficiency”.158
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To provide a structured answer to the first two concerns 
one would need to have access to data and information ex-
pressing the way in which the price of a banana (or any oth-
er good or service) is distributed across the food chain. This 
would allow verification of the statement that “value is not 
available” and provide suggestions on better ways of allo-
cating resources across the chain. Yet, this is undoubtedly 
hard to obtain because of the complexity of the food chain. 
By gathering information concerning traders and proces-
sors, for example, companies may have access to sensitive 
data concerning competitors. Similarly, information shar-
ing may lead to the finding of a potential infringement of 
competition law, as competitors may align their strategies 
to those of the transparent company. Allowing a level of 
coordination in the direction of higher transparency and a 
better understanding of the distribution of value along the 
food chain seems, therefore, a relevant step that could be 
taken under the control and coordination of national com-
petition authorities. This would dispel doubts about poten-
tial anticompetitive behaviours and improve the distribu-
tion of resources within the value chain.
Considering the banana sector, a recent survey by Oxfam 
(with the support of the French think tank Le Basic) demon-
strates that workers in the Ecuadorian banana sector only 
receive 1% of the final price and that small-scale farmers 
whose land is essential to the food chain can only seize 
4.4% of the final price paid by consumers.162 Although 
the document does not contain clear evidence of how the 
94.6% of the price is distributed, the report is clear in sug-
gesting that the largest share of the price is internalised by 
intermediaries that are operating outside of the farm. The 
lack of available value, if such, is thus determined by de-
cisions made by traders and retailers and their remuner-
ation. In this context, a critical eye would be interested in 
looking at the annual revenues of intermediaries and at the 
remuneration of shareholders and the expenses realised 
for marketing and promotion. More coordination and more 
information sharing should thus be promoted primarily 
in order to improve the transparency of the chain, the ac-
countability of the actors and the possibility to achieve an 
equitable and just distribution of resources. A 2018 report 
from Éthique sur l’étiquette and the Clean Clothes Cam-
paign, ‘Foul Play’, revealed, for example, that “while Nike 
and Adidas pay record-breaking amounts to footballers, 
they do not pay living wages to the female garment work-
ers making their shirts.”163 Similar considerations could be 
made with regards to the food chain and on-going research 
As discussed at the beginning of this section, some at-
tempts to expand the scope of Article 101 in combination 
with Article 101(3) have also been made by academics, civil 
society organisations and policymakers161. In all these cas-
es, the proposals were to reinterpret cartels and the use of 
horizontal agreements as an efficient and coordinated way 
to limit externalities and redress market failures. These sug-
gestions have been increasingly elaborated and discussed 
with regards to ‘commodities’ like cocoa and palm oil and 
they try to engage with the existing legal framework in or-
der to push for the integration of different priorities and 
interests that are not currently considered or sufficiently 
taken into account. The proponents of this approach are 
thus adopting a heterodox approach to sustainability and 
competition law, but still operating within the framework 
of efficiency, cost and well-being. 
The banana sector can be considered as a front- 
runner in the attempt by the stakeholders to 
collectively redefine the existing constraints to 
horizontal and vertical agreements so as to 
improve the living conditions of farmers. 
In the last nine years, the World Banana Forum has pro-
vided the space for a permanent working group on the 
distribution of value along the value chain, whose main at-
tention has been the analysis of current practices and the 
identification of ways in which the price paid by consumers 
could be more fairly distributed all along the chain. 
In this context, three main issues have been raised: a) that 
competitors operate with very slim margins, so that if there 
were an increase in the economic conditions of participants 
in the chain it would require an increase in the final price or 
a redistribution of resources from other actors; b) that the 
focus on margins and competition diverts attention from 
the way in which the value produced within the food sector 
is accumulated by large firms and actors that are currently 
exploring the possibility of more horizontal agreements; 
c) that the focus on competition law and horizontal agree-
ments may divert attention from the fact that companies 
could unilaterally act or that governments could impose 
mandatory requirements, and that the low prices paid to 
farmers may lead to practices that exploit both nature and 
people.
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socio-environmental externalities could be asked to com-
pensate the unfair advantage that they obtain by operating 
in the way in which they operate. If a low purchasing price 
may not be considered a form of dumping per se, the exist-
ence of child labour, environmental degradation and viola-
tions of human rights could be considered as distortions of 
the market to be redressed by means of competition law.
In general, encouraging horizontal cooperation in the in-
dustry may be a double-edged sword.
Leaving aside the comments on the intrinsic limits of an 
approach that does not challenge the market dynamics 
but tries to adapt its logic to reach socio-environmental 
sustainability, the main risks that we envisage in an expan-
sionist interpretation of article 101 that favours horizontal 
cooperation in the name of development are twofold: the 
possibility that parties agree on a narrow interpretation of 
sustainability (for example exclusively environmental and 
not social) and dismisses the interconnectedness between 
people and planet; secondly, the acceptance of anti-com-
petitive behaviours that improve certain features of the 
food chain but can have negative effects on the balance 
of power along the chain and the long-term resilience of 
small-scale food actors. The growing enthusiasm around 
a judicial or legislative reform of 101 should thus be con-
textualised and seen in perspective. The risk is to identify 
a short-term fix, for example a living price for all farmers 
who are selling to competitors in a specific area, but that 
deepens long-term problems such as dependency, power 
imbalances and concentration of the food system.
On the other hand, cooperation may generate, as described 
above, positive redistributive outcomes. However, the strict 
limit imposed by competition laws might be of a hindrance 
also to the cooperation of industry players generating such 
kinds of public utility. This is due to the fact that, as seen 
in Section 2, competition law adopts as its guiding princi-
ple the pursuit of allocative efficiency. Hence, horizontal 
cooperation that brings about higher prices is assumed to 
be anticompetitive because it creates inefficiencies in the 
market. In the face of it, Article 101 (3) TFEU could be rein-
terpreted in order to encompass distributive justice issues 
and not solely allocative efficiency166. However, this would 
entail a complete reconceptualisation of competition laws 
to consider issues of distributive justice, economic inequal-
ity, and fair distribution.
on the cocoa sector carried out by Le Basic which could 
provide useful tools for engaging not only with competition 
law but with governance and strategic decisions made by 
the intermediaries.
The third concern is: do we risk paying too much attention 
to the benefit of coordination rather than focusing on the 
anti-competitive nature of existing practices? Although we 
recognise that the final objective is the improvement in 
conditions for producers at the origin of the food chains, 
we also recognise that such an agenda may leave out im-
portant considerations that emerge from the vicious circle 
of low prices already advanced by Olivier De Schutter in 
2011:164 low wages impact the life of farmers, their children 
(who often end up working in agricultural production) and 
the environment (which is often over-exploited in order to 
increase harvests). 
We accept that no company wants to be the first to make a 
move and that there are financial and market arguments 
for firms not to be the first one to raise their purchase pric-
es. However, this should not lead to neglecting the fact 
that public authorities also have the power and authority 
to impose specific behaviours, for example by mandating 
and enforcing higher standards, as is increasingly done 
with regards to international trade and sustainability.165 
Moreover, close attention must be paid to the fact that 
guidelines or indications always run the risk of that un-
dertakings involved in horizontal dialogues on prices end 
up in coordinated practices that have nothing to do with 
the remuneration of producers. Finally, an imaginative ap-
proach to competition law should also adopt the opposite 
perspective that is proposed by firms that the role of com-
petition law should also be sanctioning those actors who 
are inputting in the market products that are obtained at 
the expense of people and the planet.
This last point appears to be not sufficiently integrated in 
the debates and discussions between food enterprises, 
civil society and public authorities. However, the argu-
ment appears pretty straightforward and in line with the 
European approach to socio-environmental dumping and 
favourable tax provisions: products that are obtained at a 
lower cost due to violations of international standards (like 
labour conditions) are benefitting from an artificial advan-
tage vis-à-vis enterprises that respect the standards. Simi-
lar to those companies that are paying less taxes and there-
fore are more competitive, undertakings that generate 
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of competition laws anytime a ‘morally unfair’ behaviour 
takes place in the market. Too often this concept is con-
fused with the much more detailed concept of unfairness 
in the law, which presents much more stringent charac-
teristics, although granted in need of better definition for 
competition law purposes. 
Secondly, fairness may be operationalised and become 
one of the legal basis for the consideration and application 
of broader public interest concerns169. This because, as has 
been observed in academia, the current price-centred ap-
proach of competition law is prone to yield unfair distrib-
utive results and negative spill-over effects170. But since, 
especially in the EU, there may be no other institutions that 
could solve these issues, such as common fiscal policies or 
environmental authorities with appropriate powers, the 
antitrust authority may intervene to tackle the unfairness 
of an anti-competitive conduct which brought about a wel-
fare loss. 
Thus, the concept of fairness could be used to punish unfair 
behaviours restricting competition in the market and as a 
conceptual basis to embed non-economic concerns in the 
antitrust enforcement mechanisms. 
5.6  The Right to Food as an 
External Limit to Competition Law 
The European Union is — relatively to other areas of the 
world — a region having access to many of the world’s food 
resources. Despite this situation, EU Members are largely 
failing to ensure access to healthy diets for their citizens171. 
5.5  Fairness in Competition Law 
Lately, competition law and competition lawyers have 
re-discovered the concept of fairness. This has ignited a 
very lively discussion, both in the United States and in the 
EU, on the feasibility of its application in competition law 
enforcement. In the EU, Commissioner Vestager has cer-
tainly earned the merit of having revived fairness in com-
petition law through many of her declarations and public 
speeches167. However, fairness has been a guiding prin-
ciple of antitrust enforcement for a long time, way before 
competition laws were reconceived to pursue only eco-
nomic efficiency (See Section 1). 
In general, the language of fairness is not new to law, as it 
is applied across the legal spectrum of civil and public law, 
from contracts to criminal procedures. A clear confirmation 
of this is the TFEU, where we find that fairness is applied 
in both Article 101 and 102. However, the critics of such a 
concept in competition law oppose it stating that it is too 
vague and its application would drastically reduce legal 
certainty168.
The concept of fairness is mentioned in the competition 
law of the EU, in the context of fair trade conditions (Arti-
cle 102 TFEU) and to allow consumers a fair share of the 
benefits (Article 101(3) TFEU). It is also a general guiding 
principle, which allows the consideration of broader public 
interests than just allocative efficiency alone. Hence, from 
an operational perspective, and to reduce legal uncertain-
ty, fairness may first find application in order, for instance, 
to solve issues related to the unconscionability of trade 
conditions which, even beyond their efficiency impact, dis-
tort the market by imposing excessively unfair conditions. 
This is, certainly, not an incentive to trigger the application 
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“Pesticides are products that matter — to farmers, con-
sumers and the environment. We need effective compe-
tition in this sector so companies are pushed to develop 
products that are ever safer for people and better for 
the environment. Our decision today ensures that the 
merger between Dow and DuPont does not reduce price 
competition for existing pesticides or innovation for saf-
er and better products in the future.” 
However, the elements were considered through the per-
spective of innovation and competition rather than as pub-
lic interests and public objectives per se.
From an EU law perspective, the right to food could be 
operationalised through the application of Articles 11 (en-
vironmental protection), 9 and 168 (human health), and 
Article 21(4) EUMR (legitimate interest clause)178. These in-
tegration clauses can become part of the competition law 
assessment through the balancing procedure advanced 
in this report, whereby the right to food as an expression 
of environmental and health concerns could be balanced 
against the economic concerns typical of the antitrust as-
sessment.
5.7  Exemptions for the 
Implementation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy
Another opportunity to bend the rigidity of competition 
law is provided by Articles 42 and 43 of the TFEU, which give 
power to the EU Institutions to create exemptions and ex-
ceptions to the application of competition laws for the agri-
cultural sector. Here, the main concern is to pursue the ob-
jectives and aims of the ‘Common Agricultural Policy’ while 
coming closer to the specific characteristics of this market. 
In particular, Article 39 TFEU defines five objectives of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that need to be pursued: 
increasing productivity of agricultural production; ensur-
ing a fair standard of living for agricultural communities; 
stabilising markets; assuring supplies and ensuring reason-
able prices for the consumer.
The two articles introduce a first exemption from the ap-
plication of competition laws (limited to Article 101 TFEU) 
which regards extreme cases of ‘severe market imbalanc-
es’ in periods of crisis. Other measures introduce market 
or sector specific derogations instead, independently from 
the period of crisis. For example, agricultural producers 
may be exempted from the application of Art. 101 TFEU if 
their agreement is “strictly necessary for the pursuit of one 
In this regard, the recently released IPES report observes 
that “[c]urrent food systems are characterised by an over-
production of energy-dense but low-nutrient processed 
foods. This has contributed to unhealthy and imbalanced 
diets across the EU.”172
A number of legal instruments, including international 
agreements, national laws and constitutions, consider the 
right to food as a fundamental right. Article 25(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that “[e]
veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, in-
cluding food”173. The right to food includes therefore the 
right to access food sources which are adequate in gener-
al, and relevant to what is possible taking into account the 
surrounding environment. 
In the mainstream vision of the right to food, food is not 
only a tradable commodity but also a fundamental human 
right174. Thus, we should ask whether trading a good that 
is also a fundamental human right changes the application 
of EU competition laws? Based on past decisions the EC 
apparently, rejects this as it has not considered the adop-
tion of a different approach based on this argument. How-
ever recent research shows that a commodity-based food 
market that does not take into consideration the rights of 
consumers has failed to achieve — in the EU and in most 
countries worldwide — the creation of a socially and envi-
ronmentally sustainable food chain. In particular, the 2017 
IPES-food report Too Big to Feed has identified five areas 
of action: consumption-related health risks; environmental 
challenges; environmental health risks; socio-economic 
challenges for farmers; and poor working condition in sup-
ply chains. 
As discussed above, two of the main consequences of 
globalisation have been the dramatic increase in the con-
centration in food value chains and — partly also as a con-
sequence of this trend — the creation of a widening gap in 
bargaining power along the supply chain.175 In 2010, the 
then special rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De 
Schutter, highlighted this connection between market con-
centration and the right to food, observing that there is a 
“direct link between the ability of competition regimes to 
address abuses of buyer power in supply chains and the 
enjoyment of the right to adequate food.”176
The right to food is also the right to safe food, environmen-
tal safety, and human health. Some of these concerns were 
considered in the Dow/DuPont merger177 (See Box 8), with 
regards to which Commissioner Vestager said that 
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or more of the objectives assigned to the Producers Organ-
izations (PO) or Associations of Producers Organizations 
(APO) concerned in compliance with EU legislation.” 
In its jurisprudence, the European Court of Justice has rec-
ognised that the competition principles contained in the 
Treaties must be refined and limited when there is a neces-
sity to achieve the objectives of the Common Agricultural 
Policy.179 In the most recent case, President of the Autorité 
de la concurrence v Association des producteurs vendeurs 
d’endives (APVE) and Others,180 the Court reversed a deci-
sion by the French competition authority concluding that 
“in the fruit and vegetables sector, the necessary practices 
for POs and APOs to achieve one or more of the objectives 
assigned to them under EU law (namely, ensuring that pro-
duction is planned and adjusted to demand, concentrating 
supply and placing the products produced on the market as 
well as optimising production costs and stabilising produc-
er prices) may escape the prohibition of agreements, de-
cisions and concerted practices laid down in the TFEU.”181 
It is noteworthy that the French authority had not author-
ised the conducts of the PO and APO that consisted of an 
agreement on the price of endives through different mech-
anisms — such as disseminating a minimum price on a 
weekly basis; setting a ‘cours pivot’ (central rate); estab-
lishing a trading exchange; setting a ‘prix cliquet’ (reserve 
price) and thereby misusing the withdrawal price mecha-
nism; — of collusion on the quantities of endives placed on 
the market and of a system for the exchange of strategic 
information used for the purpose of price maintenance. 
Those practices had been aimed at the collective fixing of a 
minimum producer price for endives and allowed produc-
ers and several professional POs to maintain minimum sale 
prices during a period.182 
Against this position, the Court restated the primacy of the 
objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy and stated 
that the overall EU legal framework is structured in a way 
that creates exemptions to the application of Article 101 
when certain practices are deemed necessary.183 On the 
other hand, the 2017 judgment reinforces the idea that the 
scope of those exclusions is to be strictly interpreted and 
that the common organisations of the markets in agricul-
tural products are not a competition-free zone184 and that 
the application of the principle of proportionality requires 
that the anti-competitive practices may not go beyond 
what is strictly necessary in order to achieve one or more 
of the objectives assigned to the PO or APO at issue, under 
the rules governing the common organisation of the mar-
ket concerned.185 Although it is far from being a blank ex-
emption for associations and producers’ organisations, the 
combined interpretation of Articles 101 and 42 offer there-
fore some possibility of discussing prices and horizontally 
coordinating, demonstrating both the exceptionality of the 
agricultural market and the fact that EU competition law is 
not monolithic and contains spaces of (strictly regulated) 
exceptions.
Alongside the general exemption of art. 39-42, the broader 
EU legal framework introduces a number of sector specific 
derogations to the general rules of the Treaties that forbid 
horizontal agreements:
a Raw milk: Article 149 and 150 in the CMO Regulation al-
lows joint negotiations in the supply of milk by produc-
ers, provided that this negotiation does not exceed 33% 
of the total national production.
b Olive oil, beef-and veal, arable crops: Articles 169-171 
allows joint sales and agreements on quantities, pro-
vided that “1- producers integrate in producer organi-
sations, 2- these producer organisations carry out ac-
tivities other than joint-selling that creates efficiencies 
(such as joint procurement, joint distribution, joint 
storage, etc.) and 3- the sales of the producer organisa-
tions do not exceed some specified thresholds.” 
c Ham sector: Article 172 establishes that Member States 
can authorise exemptions on agreements on sale quan-
tities and production between independent producers 
of ham with a protected designation of origin or pro-
tected geographical indication. 
d Fruit and vegetables: Article 33 allows ‘operational pro-
grammes’, which means the planning of production, 
agreements for the improvement of product quality, 
the promotion of products, environmental measures, 
crisis prevention and management. These operational 
programmes need to be submitted to MSs for their ap-
proval. 
e Sugar: a limited possibility to benefit from a partial ex-
emption exists also for agreements between beet grow-
ers and sugar processors, according to Article 125.
f Wine: Article 167 allows MSs to approve agreements 
limiting the marketing rules for regulating the supply.
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5.8  Public Interest in the 
Exceptional Case of Mergers
A number of jurisdictions in the EU consider, directly or 
indirectly, public interest concerns in their assessment of 
mergers and acquisitions. One may wonder, what hap-
pened then to the ‘purity’ of competition economics in the 
sudden ‘urge’ to skip the conceptualisation of competition 
raised with a number of acquisitions which were deemed 
to impact ‘strategic’ industries? For instance, the acqui-
sition of Alstom by General Electric was initially opposed 
by the French Government on the basis of protecting the 
national energy industry.186 Similarly, when the U.S. phar-
maceutical giant Pfizer made an offer to buy Astra Zeneca 
Plc, a UK pharma company, the British Government, the 
Authorities, and public opinion started a heated debate 
around the possible adverse impact of this acquisition of 
the UK’s science base. 
At present, twelve EU Member States consider public in-
terest concerns in their impact assessment of a proposed 
merger or acquisition.187
The OECD reports that: “[m]any OECD Members have claus-
es permitting the state to intervene in merger control on 
various public policy grounds, such as: 
 → industrial development, protecting employment, pro-
moting the competitiveness of the undertakings in in-
ternational competition in France; 
 → benefits to the economy as a whole or an overriding 
public interest in Germany; 
 → relevant general interests of national economy, within 
the context of European integration in Italy;
 → general interest reasons in the Netherlands; 
 → questions of principle or interest of major significance 
to society in Norway; 
 → the benefits to fundamental strategic interest of the na-
tional economy in Portugal;
 → national defence and security, protection of public se-
curity and public health, free movement of goods and 
services within the national territory, protection of the 
environment, promotion of technical research and de-
velopment and the maintenance of the sector regula-
tion objectives in Spain;
 → exceptional public interests, such as national security, 
media plurality, or the stability of the financial system 
in the United Kingdom.”188 However, the case of Bayer 
and Monsanto discussed above (Box 8) demonstrates 
that these considerations have not trickled down to the 
area of pesticides, petrochemical products or the envi-
ronmental and social sustainability of the food system.
CMO Regulation
CAP derogations
Periods of crisis
Specialisation
Block Exemption
Regulation 
Joint processingArt. 222 CMO General
CAP derogations 
Art. 209 CMO
Art. 210 CMO
Product specific
CAP derogations 
Competition rules
Any market situation
Individual
assessment 
Art. 101(3) TFEU 
Raw milk & cheese, 
Olive oil, Beef & veal,
Arable crops, Ham,
Fruit & Vegetables, 
Sugar, Wine.
Source: EC, 2016
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ble parameters that aim at ‘fixing a failure’. On the contrary, 
the substantive and procedural content of competition law 
is essential to the production, reproduction and dismantle-
ment of power dynamics among market players and to the 
generation, distribution and appropriation of value within 
and across value chains. Yet, since the 1980s the ‘bubble’ of 
competition law has been filled with the idea that there is 
only one economics, only one set of market rules, and that 
competition law is only about making the ‘invisible hand’ 
work properly. 
Within the context where competition law builds relation-
ships and has an impact on the organisation of markets, 
society and the environment, this report suggests that the 
enforcement of competition law encroaches on other pub-
lic policy considerations which the law explicitly protects. 
Thus, the question that animates this publication is not 
if competition law should consider them, but how and to 
what extent. 
As discussed throughout this report, there is 
not only one way in which competition law 
and competitiveness can impact on planetary 
boundaries and the social foundations of  
our world.
For example, the lack of competition and the increased con-
centration in the seed production sector and the vertical 
integration between seeds, pesticides and pharmaceutical 
producers will negatively impact biodiversity, non-conven-
tional farming, and the availability of jobs and people’s 
health. In complete contrast, a potentially anticompetitive 
agreement between competitors or undertakings operat-
ing vertically across the chain may be used to introduce 
a common minimum price for small-scale producers that 
are overburdened by the actual power imbalances vis-a-vis 
purchasers and retailers. How should we engage with these 
scenarios? Should legal and political institutions strike a 
balance — required by the law — between consumer wel-
fare and other ‘economic’ concerns explicitly protected by 
competition law? Should the non-economic concerns have 
priority over competition as an end in itself? Which insti-
tutions should perform the balancing act between these 
different interests and what limitations would apply to this 
balancing process?
The global food chain has been constructed around the Ri-
cardian idea of comparative advantage and competition for 
market shares. Throughout the world, the global network 
of food production is characterised by access and the ex-
ploitation of natural resources; an interlocked series of bar-
gaining actions that take place between actors operating 
at different tiers; investments that lead to horizontal and 
vertical integration and business choices that depend on 
the power to coordinate the chain and seize an increased 
share of market and value. 
Competitive practices and the struggle for 
consumers are considered to be inherent ele- 
ments of this system which can improve the 
general well-being of society by pushing for 
lower prices, more innovation, and more 
choice. 
In a framework structured around price and consumers, 
the material condition of farmers, households, companies, 
etc. and the distribution of value throughout the chains are 
forgotten. However, competition authorities and private 
companies continuously take decisions — in the name of 
competition or to avoid it — that heavily affect the condi-
tions of these other members of society. The behaviours 
and decisions of individual actors in the food system, their 
business strategies and the regulatory framework, not only 
impact on the competitive dimensions of the relevant mar-
kets (distribution of shares, prices, innovation, availability, 
etc), but have a direct consequence on other social or envi-
ronmental aspects of the society in which they are active. 
Yet, mainstream economics and mainstream 
competition law often fail to see society, the 
planet, and the household as relevant compo-
nents of the economy.
Despite the idea that the market is self-regulated, behav-
iours and decisions do not operate in a legal vacuum or in 
a space that is exclusively defined by private agreements. 
Rather, law (including competition law and policy) brings 
about a number of spill-over effects in other sectors of the 
economy and in society. The current framework of EU com-
petition law is not, therefore, a mere technical and neutral 
tool that solves disputes by applying objectives and inevita-
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to have official guidelines assisting the EC and other stake-
holders in this process. The same guidelines, which could 
build on this report and on other literature also cited here, 
would help national authorities to build their own practice, 
which would need however, to adapt the EC’s approach to 
the specificities of the domestic legal environment and in-
stitutional design. 
The historical and contemporary analysis that 
we propose in this report suggests that EU 
competition law is anything but a static sector 
and that it is important to have a clear under-
standing of its legal pluralism. 
Treaties, secondary regulations, national competition au-
thorities, the European Commission, the European Court 
of Justice and national courts all interact, along with lob-
byists, civil society, academics and other private actors 
on the definition of principles, aims and procedures. The 
current outcome is the product of pushes and pulls, power 
and resistance to power, path dependency and the lack of 
alternative imagination. 
What we have described in Section 2 and 3 of this report as 
the mainstream approach to EU competition law is neither 
inevitable nor natural. On the contrary, the Treaties and 
some precedent decisions of the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice suggest that the route 
could change. In particular, public policy concerns and fun-
damental rights may be weighed in against competition 
law in different ways. The last part of this report is thus 
dedicated to a series of paradigmatic, regulatory, legal and 
policy solutions.194 We do not offer a detailed analysis and 
we do not claim that the future of EU competition law must 
pass through these measures. On the contrary, our inten-
tion is to highlight spaces of possible legal intervention and 
legal chokeholds that can be leveraged by different actors 
so as to shape competition law in such a way that the short 
and long-term goal of a socially and environmentally just 
food system can be achieved.
This report has substantiated that there are 
cases where competition law is the only institu- 
tion able to balance economic and non-eco-
nomic factors related to competitive distor-
tions in the agri-food sector. 
Or at least the best placed. However, there are circum-
stances where it might be more appropriate to abandon 
the rhetoric of efficiency and seek cooperation between 
different authorities and institutions. However, in the 
selection of which institution to leverage (which area of 
law, a legal or political intervention, which authority, etc.) 
consideration has to be given to the specific institutional 
design of each system, and therefore it may vary across 
countries. As already observed by the OECD, “the institu-
tional design of the public bodies involved in this process 
would be key to understand if these institutions are alter-
native or complements.”189 For instance, some national an-
titrust systems opted for a single-authority model, where 
the competition authority is also enabled to apply public 
interest concerns.190 Others have chosen to create institu-
tions with shared competences, for example in the case of 
media mergers. In some jurisdictions, problems are solved 
through a system of ‘external intervention’, where a minis-
ter or other policy-body intervenes when the decision in-
volves the broader public interest. Finally, there might be 
concurrent competences between different authorities, in 
which case, the coordination between them, along with an 
interpretation of the law in accordance with the overarch-
ing (constitutional principle) becomes the key to a coher-
ent legal system.
These multidimensional approaches share a common sub-
structure that seeks the least imperfect solutions to issues 
that are generally left to unilateral solutions that consid-
er only narrow definitions of efficiency and competitive-
ness.191 At the EU level, this could be done even without 
the specific intervention of the legislator, but it would not 
take the form of a radical and systemic intervention. As 
discussed in Section 5.1, the EC already has an obligation 
to integrate other public interest concerns into its compe-
tition law decisions. If the final decision does not conform 
to the contrasting public interest concern, the ECJ has the 
power to annul it.192 At present, European and national 
authorities enjoy wide discretionary powers in determin-
ing the balance between the different public policy aims, 
opening up a political space where legal interpretations 
and economic visions define the allocation of value and re-
sources.193 Whilst attempting a definition of public interest 
in EU law would be futile, given the dynamic and change-
able nature of this concept, it would instead be desirable 
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6.a  Interpretative Changes
1 Interpretation in accordance with the overarching 
principles: All competition authorities and judges 
should aim to interpret the law in accordance with the 
overarching principles of the legal system (constitu-
tional laws, fundamental rights, and provisions over-
arching — by the letter of the law — the application of 
competition laws, such as Article 11 TFEU in the EU)196. 
This principle responds not only to the hierarchy of the 
sources of law, but also to a principle of good adminis-
tration, which should aim at preventing conflicting de-
cisions by different public bodies. For instance, in the 
case of the right to food, the decision of a competition 
authority authorising certain behaviours, may conflict 
with a decision on infringement of environmental pro-
tection or of trade authorities acting alongside the fun-
damental right to food and environmental protection.
2 Extending the use of exemptions: when the antitrust 
authorities are already engaged with a claim, they 
should read the Treaties in a holistic way and expand 
the use of exemptions like article 101(3), articles 39-42, 
and the discipline on mergers. In this way, the author-
ities would recognise the application of public interest 
and constitutional claims as objective justifications to 
an anticompetitive conduct, if they respond to the prin-
ciples of proportionality and effectiveness. However, 
this expansionist approach to competition law should 
not be utilised to reduce the responsibilities that indi-
vidual companies and individual states have in guar-
anteeing that both environmental and social limits are 
respected within the food system. 
3 Public interest balancing: competition authorities may 
directly apply public interest concerns as part of their 
infringement decision. However, this decision should 
be part of a solid comparative institutional analysis 
aimed at finding the institution that is better placed 
(‘the least imperfect’) at giving application to the public 
interest concern.197 In the case described, competition 
law may find application, depending on the specific 
characteristics of the legal system, for instance, along 
with contract law, property law, and the constitution 
or other fundamental rights’ provisions. Moreover, the 
adjudicative would only be an alternative institution to 
‘market’ and ‘political’ institutions, as it may be better 
to leave the protection of such rights to the legislator 
(see below) or to the market itself, for instance.
This report urges reform of the current approach to compe-
tition law, which mainly relies on consumer welfare. It does 
so by considering the consumer as a citizen and the envi-
ronment as part of the market. And it proposes solutions 
that can start the change in this direction.
These solutions range from direct legislative interventions 
to different enforcement strategies of current laws. Where-
as there is not a one-size-fits-all panacea, it is possible to 
find tailored solutions to specific issues of competition and 
sustainability. Regulatory and interpretative solutions are 
indeed jurisdiction-specific, as they have to be harmonised 
with the rest of the regulatory environment in order to 
function properly. However, it is possible to trace a com-
mon direction that domestic jurisdictions can operation-
alise differently. Moreover, our final proposals only aim to 
trigger discussions and further engagement with the issue., 
they do not claim to be exhaustive or the best that can be 
conceptualised in order to change the status quo. Finally, 
the following solutions do not presuppose a reconceptual-
isation of competition law, proposing, for example, differ-
ent objectives. They, instead, look at competition law as 
part of a regulatory environment responding to the ‘rule of 
law’, intended as “the principle whereby all members of a 
society (including those in government)” and — we would 
add — including all institutions “are considered equally 
subject to publicly disclosed legal codes and processes”.195 
In this report we have repeated several times that compe-
tition law does not apply in a vacuum and is not an end in 
itself. It is instead a legal institution useful for combatting 
specific behaviours but one that has to find application 
within the rest of the legal environment. If a contract is il-
legal because it breaches an environmental law, the other 
party cannot sue for breach of contract, invoking the sanc-
tity of contract law. By the same token, EU competition 
law needs to be applied in accordance with other EU laws. 
However, this solves only the ‘if’ and ‘why’ of the question 
of whether competition law should consider such environ-
mental concerns. The ‘how’ is instead slightly more com-
plex and needs adaptation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
The following eight points recommend some practical solu-
tions on how to embed sustainability concerns into compe-
tition law, from a regulatory and enforcement perspective, 
while the last two highlight the importance of cooperation 
between authorities to abet this process. For simplicity, we 
have gathered the proposals into three broad categories: 
a) interpretative changes and enforcement; b) institutional 
changes; c) regulatory changes. 
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and future transformations to competition laws and 
their enforcement would abet positive changes. Firstly, 
they would spread better knowledge about which reg-
ulatory solutions are available in each jurisdiction. And, 
secondly, it would create positive knowledge of possi-
ble alternative solutions.
6 Look around for examples: Competition regulation 
has been increasingly adopted by countries around 
the world. Although the content of the legislations is 
often a replica of the US or EU models, some countries 
have been at the forefront of a more progressive un-
derstanding of competition law, one that is defined by 
other public interests, such as employment, economic 
stability, the protection of the environment. Regula-
tors, courts and civil society should thus pay attention 
to what is happening in other geographies, including in 
each EU member state, and favour the creation of spac-
es for dialogue and horizontal teaching and learning. 
6.c  Regulatory Changes
7 Direct regulatory intervention: when competition law 
fails to mend the distortion of competitiveness in a 
given market and interpretative and enforcement solu-
tions are not sufficient, it may be possible to intervene 
through direct government intervention. For example, 
it is possible to subsidise a whole industry by providing 
direct or indirect support. However, this may discour-
age investments in innovation and market improve-
ments as participants get subsidies irrespective of their 
success or prominence. Otherwise, policy makers may 
want to facilitate collaboration among market actors 
pursuing special objectives or deserving protection, 
because they are particularly valuable for preserving 
public interest concerns, by for instance creating block 
exemptions to antitrust enforcement. While the exemp-
tions may pursue commendable social, economic, and 
political objectives, they may also paint everything 
with a broad brush, thus losing in enforcement preci-
sion. Hence, direct regulatory intervention is recom-
mended only as an ‘extrema ratio’, that is when other 
types of intervention here described are unsuitable. 
6.b  Institutional Changes
4 Reconsidering the institutional design of competition 
authorities: the institutional design of the public bodies 
involved in this process would be key to understanding 
if these institutions are alternatives or complements198. 
For instance, some systems opted for a single-authority 
model, whereby the competition authority is also ena-
bled to apply public interest concerns199. Others have 
chosen to create institutions with shared competenc-
es, for example in the case of mergers regarding mar-
kets of particular importance for the national economy 
or for democracy. Also used, is the system of ‘external 
intervention’, where a minister or other policy-body in-
tervenes when the decision involves the broader public 
interest. As a matter of fact, there might be concurrent 
competences between different authorities, in which 
case, the coordination between them, along with an 
interpretation of the law in accordance with the over-
arching (constitutional principle) becomes the key to a 
coherent legal system. For instance, if a system of exter-
nal intervention is in place, the competition authority 
would be required to suspend the antitrust procedures 
when it encounters a conflict between the application 
of competition laws and sustainability. The competi-
tion authority would then wait for the competent exter-
nal authority (the government or an ad-hoc authority 
for instance) to release a comment, which might be 
binding or not. By contrast, in the single authority mod-
el, the competition authority would have the power to 
directly apply the sustainability concerns, as they be-
come part of the enforcement powers of the authority. 
5 International cooperation: there are a number of inter-
national organisations, such as UNCTAD, the ICN, and 
the OECD, facilitating the interaction and communica-
tion between antitrust authorities all over the world. It 
would be particularly useful to have a set of case studies 
to build on, in order to test the existing framework and 
the possible breaches. Moreover, test cases and direct 
intervention in the area could nudge national authori-
ties, the European Commission or international organ-
isations, to draft guidelines detailing how competition 
laws could be adapted to include sustainability issues 
without subordinating them to the consumer-price 
constraint. While we do not believe that full harmoni-
sation is a goal attainable in the medium to short term, 
given the existing striking differences between the dif-
ferent legal systems, their regulatory choices, and the 
institutional design of their authorities, we think that 
more and better information about the past, present, 
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Modern Slavery Act in the United Kingdom and the Cal-
ifornia Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (SB-
657), retailers, distributors and importers can be sanc-
tioned for violations occurring across the chain in which 
they operate. In other circumstances, trade law can 
be used to impose constraints on the import of goods 
that are obtained in violation of national and/or inter-
national law: both Article XX of the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the European Treaties 
recognise the possibility of limiting trade (in a non-dis-
criminatory way) in order to uphold environmental and 
social sustainability. Yet, competition law is seldom 
taken into consideration, as if its introduction into the 
market of products, that do not respect the legal stand-
ards in the country of origin or international law, was 
not a matter of unfair practices and artificial cheapness 
(i.e. the products are cheap because negative external-
ities are not internalised). We thus believe that, along 
with tort, trade, human rights and environmental law, 
competition law may have a role to play in addressing 
some of the unsustainable practices that occur in the 
food chain. For example, we believe there is space for 
anti-dumping proceedings (sanctioning countries that 
do not enforce legal standards so that products are 
cheaper to obtain); investigations for predatory pricing 
(putting products on the market at a price that is lower 
than the cost of production, given that the whole cost 
of production is not accounted for) and private actions 
against competitors that are benefitting from cheap 
production mechanisms. An expansionary use of com-
petition law may not happen immediately, but it would 
contribute to the transition towards a market based 
on different premises and a legal framework where 
competition is not an end in itself but a mechanism to 
achieve public interest and broader goals.
8 Case selection criterion: competition authority action 
may also consider non-economic factors when decid-
ing whether to take on a case. A competition authori-
ty may (and in some cases do) consider such kinds of 
non-economic aspects in order to prioritise a case over 
others.200 Instead of becoming substantive elements 
of adjudication (therefore left to the participation and 
pressure of the parties), public interests such as human 
rights, the environment, and the right to food may be 
taken into consideration in the preliminary phase of the 
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